首 页  |  中国禅学  |  禅学三书  |  慈辉论坛  |  佛学论文  |  最新上传  |  文学频道  |  佛缘论坛  |  留言簿   |

 管理登陆        吴言生 创办              图片中心    关于本网     佛教研究所 主办


  • 一个能让你变幸福的方法![108]

  • 一灯能破千年暗,一智能灭万年[127]

  • 禅修,是你坏情绪的橡皮擦[109]

  • 佛教故事|佛祖会来救我的[136]

  • 下次你路过,人间已无我[117]

  • 佛说看破放下,做来真的好难[139]

  • 梦参老和尚:学佛者应如何善用[135]

  • 修行尽分,度众随缘[143]

  • 红尘之外有茶香:茶禅与茶僧史[118]

  • 安国寺造像:唐代密宗的见证[160]

  • 学佛之人想要成就,一定要在这[137]

  • 佛教基本教义(四):四土[161]



  • 本站推荐

    安国寺造像:唐代密

    庄子:不属于自己的

    忆佛念佛,必定见佛


       您现在的位置: 佛学研究网 >> E3英文佛教 >> [专题]e3英文佛教 >> 正文


    Early Saamkhya in the Buddhacarita
     
    [ 作者: Kent, Stephen A.   来自:期刊原文   已阅:3709   时间:2006-12-26   录入:douyuebo


    ·期刊原文


    Early Saamkhya in the Buddhacarita

    Kent, Stephen A.

    Philosophy East and West

    Vol.32:3(July 1982)   P.259-278

    The University of Hawaii Press

    (C) by University of Hawaii Press



                                    P.259


            INTRODUCTION

            In  the  twelth  canto  of the  Buddhacarita  (B)(1)
            A'svagho.sa describes the sage Araa.da's metaphysical
            system, (2) and  provides  statements concerning the
            liberating  knowledge that people achieve by working
            through it.  Araa.da's metaphysical  system consists
            of twenty-five  principles, the highest  of which is
            distinct  from  the  others.   Liberating  knowledge
            involves   the  highest  principle   "knowing"   its
            separation  from  the  other  consituents,  and  the
            technique  by which the highest  principle  realizes
            this knowledge  is the cultivation  of the powers of
            discrimination.
            Araa.da's   metaphysical   system   bears   striking
            resemblances  to systems  that appear in other texts
            from roughly the same era. For instance, it has such
            close affinities  with metaphysical  systems in Book
            Twelve of the Mahaabhaarata(Mbh) , the Mok.sadharma,
            (3) that  the translator  of the  Buddhacarita, E.H.
            Johnston,  suspects   both  works   have   a  common
            authority,  possibly  a  text  of  the  little-known
            Var.saga.nya school.(4)Additional similarities exist
            in certain  passages  of the Bhagavadgiitaa(Bvg),(5)
            but the difficulties  over  dating  the latter  text
            make  the  question  of influence  between  the  two
            impossible  to  answer  with  certainty.(6)  Another
            similar metaphysical  description  is elaborated  in
            the Indian medical text from the first century c.e.,
            the  Caraka  Sa.mhitaa(CS) , (7) and  various resem-
            blances between Araa.da's reputed system, as well as
            several differences, readily can be identified.  (8)
            Finally, several Upani.sads(U), especially the Katha
            Upani.sad and the 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad, contain
            descriptions  of metaphysical  systems that resemble
            Araa.da's.(9)
              Araa.da's  system, along  with  the  systems  that
            resemble  it, often  are  referred  to as  forms  of
            "early Saa.mkhya," (10) and therefore  a prelude  to
            II'svarak.r.s.na's classical Saa.mkhya(11) system of
            about  the  fifth  century   C.E.(12)  Johnston, for
            instance, speaks in this manner.  Franklin Edgerton,
            in  contrast,  argues  that  these  so-called  early
            Saa.mkhya systems within the Bhagavadgiitaa  and the
            Mahaabhaarata   are  but  aspects   of  "Upani.sadic
            Brahmanism," and  do not  represent  doctrines  of a
            distinctive   school   of  thought.(13)  His   view,
            however, cannot explain all relevant passages in the
            Mahaabhaarata, and therefore  we must assume that an
            independent  tradition  of nontheism  was developing
            during  this  era, and that it occasionally  reveals
            itself  in  the  texts.(14) Nonetheless,  Edgerton's
            argument   has  merit   when  we  apply  it  to  the
            Buddhacarita  the metaphysics of the twelfth canto
            "are  set  in a framework  which  espouses  the  old
            Upani.sadic  notions of aatman and brahman." (15) So
            it is in the Buddhacarita  that Araa.da  follows his
            description  of the  path  of knowledge  (saa.mkhya,
            although  he does  not use the term  itself) with  a
            description of "another


                                    P.260


            method  [of]  the  same  dharma, "  that  is,  yogic
            trances.  The two descriptions  do not disagree over
            metaphysic, just method.(16) to refer, therefore, to
            the  metaphysics   of  the  twelfth   canto  of  the
            Buddhacarita  as "early  Saa.mkhya"  is not to imply
            that Araa.da's  reputed  system was among those that
            were  beginning  to  distinguish   themselves   from
            orthodoxy.  Our use of the term will  be a heuristic
            one,(17) used to facilitate our efforts in examining
            the  metaphysics   of  the  tewlfth  canto  by  both
            comparing  them  to the  later  classical  Saa.mkhya
            system, and by contrasting  them  with  the Buddhist
            criticisms  that A'svagho.sa  levels  throgh Gautama
            (as the Bodhisattva  and the Buddha).  When helpful,
            references  will be made to appropriate  sections of
            A'svagho.sa's   story  of  Nanda's  conversion,  the
            Saundarananda  (S),(18) as well as to passages  from
            the    Mahaabhaarata,   the    Bhagavadgiitaa,   the
            Yoga-Suutras (YS) (19) and the Upani.sads.

            A'SVAGHO.SA'S RENDITION OF ARAA.DA'S SAA.MKHYA SYSTEM

            Within  verses  17-42  of the twelfth  canto  of the
            Buddhacarita, A'svagho.sa  presents Araa.da's  early
            Saa.mkhya  system, and in verses  69-82  offers  the
            bodhisattva's  subsequent  rejection  of  it.(Verses
            43-63 present a means to salvation  through  trances
            [dhyaana-s]  that  actually  have a closer  affinity
            with Buddhist yogic states than with orthodox Indian
            ones, and  verses  66-67  state  the  names  of  the
            previous great sages of what Araa.da considers to be
            the joint Saa.mkhya-yoga tradition.)(20)
              Araa.da's system consists of twenty-five principles
            (tattva-s) in which a distinction exists between one
            tattva,   aatman(21)  or   knower   of   the   field
            (k.setrajnna),(22)and  the  other  twenty-four.  The
            twenty-four are further divided into two groups: one
            group of eight called  prak.rti(primary  matter) and
            another  group of sixteen  derived  from the former,
            called vikaara (secondary matter or "production"  or
            "derivative"  [B xii 17-20]).  Prak.rti consists  of
            avyakta   (unseen   power) ,  buddhi   (intellect) ,
            aha.mkaara  (ego), and the five bhuuta-s (elements).
            Vikaara consists  of the five objects of the senses,
            the five senses, the hands  and feet, the voice, the
            organs  of  generation   and  excretion,  and  manas
            (mind).  The  exact  process  by  which  either  the
            eightfold  prak.rti  generates  itself  or  prak.rti
            generates  the sixteen secondary  evolutes  is never
            explained in this text.(23)
              Together these twenty-four  tattva-s  comprise the
            field (k.setra). Matter, both primary and secondary,
            is called"the  seen"  and  is "that  which  is born,
            grows old, suffers  from disease  and dies." AAtman,
            in contrast, is described as possessing the opposite
            of  these  attributes  (B  xii, 22).(24) The  aatman
            continues  to transmigrate  until  it  discriminates
            between   itself   (the   unseen,  intelligent,  and
            unmanifest) and "the seen"  (the  unintelligent  and
            the  manifest  [B  xii, 29, 40-41]).  A  dualism  is
            present here between the knower of the field and the
            field  itself, and this  dualism  is to become  more
            clearly pronounced in the classical school(SK XIX).

            SVABHAAVA(INHERENT) NATURE UNDERLYING THE EIGHTFOLD
            PRAK.RTI

            A multifeatured  unity known as svabhaava  underlies
            the  eightfold  prak.rti  and serves  as its  motive
            force for creation. Its features are identified in B
            xviii, 29-41


                                   P.261


            as part of a series of arguments in which the Buddha
            is refuting  the theory that Nature  (svabhaava)(25)
            is the  Creator  of the  universe.  In these  verses
            svabhaava  is described  as single essence (31), all
            pervading   (32) ,   without   attribute   (34)   or
            characteristics  (35), a perpetual  cause (that  is,
            eternal  [35]),  productive  (36), not  perceptible,
            unmanifest (39) and inanimate,and without conscious-
            ness (ace-tana?[40]).(26)
            The crucial  arguments  offered  to refute svabhaava
            center around "the rule that attributes of an effect
            must  also be in the cause".  A'svagho.sa  (via  the
            Buddha) objects to the early Saa.mkhya svabhaava  on
            the  grounds  that  since  it  is without  attribute
            (gu.na[34]) or characteristics  (vi'se.sa) it cannot
            be  the  cause  of  the  world  (or  universe) whose
            physical constructions are pervaded by both.(27)
              We find the same features used to  describe svabh-
            aava in the Buddhacarita also being assigned to avy-
            akta,  the  ummanifest, in  SKX    XI.(28) of  the
            classical school, with but one important difference.
            The avyakta  of the classical  scheme  contains  the
            three  gu.na-s  and through  them it possesses  both
            attributes  and  characteristics. It thereby differs
            from the early svabhaava, which has neither. Because
            of  the  gu.na-s,  A'svagho.sa's   criticism  of  an
            (inherent) nature  in  Saa.mkhya  as  being  without
            attribute(s) or characteristics and therefore unable
            to be the cause of a material world full of both, is
            effectively  countered  in the classical  system (SK
            XII  XIII).(29) In fact  SK XIV specifically  says
            "the  unmanifest  (avyakta) is likewise  established
            because  of the  gu.na-nature  in the  cause  of the
            effect (or because the effect has the same qualities
            as the cause)." This theory  of gu.na production  in
            classical Saa.mkhya may have been influenced  by the
            early  notions  of  the  inherent  productivity   of
            svabhaava  (as  we are  about  to explain).  (30) In
            addition, the eightfold  prak.rti in early Saa.mkhya
            may  have evolved into the classical system's verti-
            cal  emanation pattern, involving  the karmendriya-s
            (five organs  of action), the buddhiindriya-s  (five
            senses), manas (mind), and the tanmaatra-s (the five
            subtle  elements).  (31) In any case, before  we can
            reconstruct the process by which the features of the
            early Saa.mkhya svabhaava  become attributed  to the
            avyakta of classical  Saa.mkhya, we must unravel the
            complicated  development  of the  gu.na-s.  It is to
            this task that we now turn.

            THE EARLY AVYAKTA (UNSEEN FORCE) AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
            GU.NA-S

            Nowhere  in A'svagho.sa's  description  of Araa.da's
            Saa.mkhya  system  are the three gu.na-s  mentioned,
            despite  the fact that A'svagho.sa  knows of them (B
            vii  53, and n.) and  even  refutes  them  at B xxvi
            10-14.  There seem to be several  reasons  for their
            omission.  To  begin, the  variety  of  descriptions
            attached    to   the   term   gu.na-s   within   the
            Mahaabhaarata  verses  of early Saa.mkhya  indicates
            that  their  meaning  is  in a state  of flux.  (32)
            A'svagho.sa, however, seems  to use  them  in a form
            different still from those of the epic, since to him
            they seem to signify  " the three bhaava-s"  (states
            of being) closely identified  with moral attributes.
            (33) It was these three bhaava-s in the capacity  as
            moral attributes  within  avyakta, the unseen force,
            that determine for the latter the means or mechanism
            by which the individual is


                                    p.262


            bound to sa.msaara.  Because  the gu.na-s only are a
            facilitationg   force  to  avyakta,  E.   H.Johnston
            believes  that A'svagho.sa  feels no need to mention
            them in Araa.da's Saa.mkhya description. (34)

            THE THREE EARLY SAA.MKHYA GU.NA-S AND THE BUDDHIST ROOTS OF
            GOOD AND EVIL

            The  gu.na  development  within  Brahmanism  closely
            parallels the development of the Buddhist notions of
            the three roots of goods (ku'salamuula) (35) and the
            roots  of evil (aku'salamuula), (36) and A'svagho.sa
            may take advantage  of this  correspondence.  We see
            their   parallelism,   as   does   A'svagho.sa,   by
            associating  the three  roots of good with the gu.na
            sattva  and the three roots of evil with the gu.na-s
            rajas and tamas.  (37) Through  this association  we
            can understand more fully the processes of salvation
            in the  appropriate  developmental  stages  of  both
            Buddhism and early Saa.mkhya thought. (38)
              The three roots of evil are raaga (passion),dve.sa
            (hatred, enmity), and  moha  (ignorance, as delusion
            of   mind) ,  (39)  but,  in  addition,  A'svagho.sa
            occasionally  uses the gu.na term rajas to cover the
            two Buddhist  terms raaga and dve.sa  (B vii, 53 and
            n.). These three roots of evil, along with the three
            roots of good, are the cause  (hetu) by which karman
            is perpetuated. Interestingly, in the Pali Nikaayas,
            nirvaa.na is achieved with the disappearance  of the
            three  roots  of evil, (40) a feat  achieved  in the
            Saundarananda by yoga techniques. (41) Similarly, in
            this  early  stage  of Saa.mkhya, liberation  occurs
            when the gu.na-s  rajas  and tamas are destroyed  by
            the increase  of sattva  (B  xxvi  10-11) . The des-
            truction  of  ignorance  (and  the  acquisition   of
            knowledge) is complemented  by an increase  in  good
            deeds  and  moral  merit, and  this  destruction  of
            ignorance   is  brought  about  "through   learning,
            intelligence  and  effort"  (B xxvi  11).  Certainly
            'effort' involves a meditational process (as it does
            in the Saundarananda text and Yoga).42
              Worth noting, however, are the differences between
            the Buddhsit hetu and the gu.na-s, since A'svagho.sa
            criticizes the early Saa.mkhya salvational  model as
            self-contradictory.  Essentially  he argues  (B xxvi
            10-14) that sattva can never destroy rajas and tamas
            because, by  definition, all  three  are  permanent.
            (43) A'svago.sa, in contrast, accepts  the  standard
            notion  of the skandha-s, which  are impermanent  by
            definition, and whose karmic causes can therefore be
            destroyed. (44)

            THE FIVE SKANDHA-S AND THE SAA.MKHYA TATTVA-S OF
            MATTER

            Interestingly,  the  content   of  these   skandha-s
            corresponds  closely to the early Saa.mkhya analysis
            of the  corporeal individual,  omitting the avyakta.
            (45) The  skandha  rupa  (physical  form,  body)  is
            analogous  to the elements  and  their  evolutes,the
            objects  of the senses;  vedanaa (sensation) equates
            with the senses; samj~naa (ideation, perception, the
            naming  faculty) with  the Saa.mkhya  manas  (mind);
            vij~naana (consciousness) with the early buddhi; and
            sa.mskaara  (dispositions, formative  forces, mental
            phenomena), insofar  as it was thought  to relate to
            the  "integrating  action  of the  personality, with
            aha.mkaara" (46) An additional


                                    p.263


            ucomparative  point involves  the influence  of "the
            power  of the act" in both systems, it being  one of
            the  three   causes   of  transmigration   in  early
            Saa.mkhya  (B xii 23) and also serving  as the means
            by which the skandha-s are perpetuated (S xvii 19).

            THE SAA.MKHYA  CAUSES  OF SA.MSAARA  AND THE FACTORS
            THROUGH WHICH THEY WORK

            Returning again to Araa.da's  Saa.mkhya description,
            the sage  first  first  gives  the three  causes  of
            sa.msaara  as being wrong knowledge  (aj~naana), the
            power  of the  act (karman), and  desire  or craving
            (t.r.s.naa  [B xii  23]).  These  three  causes  are
            comparable   to  the   Buddhist   cause   (hetu)  of
            transmigration: moha  (ignorance,  delusion),  raaga
            (passion), and dve.sa (hatred, enmity). Within early
            Saa.mkhya, the  three  causes  seem  to function  by
            eight factors  (B xii 23-24) in a manner as follows:
            (47)

            Sa.msaara

          
          Three causes of     Factors by which the three    
          sa.msaara           causes work                   
          
          wrong knowledge   1.misunderstanding (vipratyaya  
           (aj~naana)         [see B xii 25])               
                            2.wrong attribution of person-  
                              ality (aha.mkaara [see B xii  
                              26])                          
                            3.confusion of thought(sa.mdeha 
                              [see B xii 27])               
                            4.wrong conjunction (abhisamp-  
                              lava [see B xii 28])          
                            5.lack of discrimination        
                              (avi'se.sa [see B xii 29])    
          
          power of the act  6.wrong means (anupaaya         
           (karman)           [see B xii 30])               
          
          desire or craving 7.attachment (sa^nga            
           (t.r.s.naa)        [see B xii 31])               
                            8.falling away (abhyavapaata    
                              [see B xii 32])               
          
            Araa.da  continues  by explaining  what he means  by
            each of the eight factors  by which the three causes
            of sa.msaara  function  (B xii  25-32).After  having
            done so, however, he also attributes  transmigration
            to a fivefold  ignorance  (B xii 33-37),(48) as well
            as  to  a  person's  unjusted  identification   with
            corporeal  individuality  (B xii 38).  It is unclear
            how  these  descriptions   of  the  causes  and  the
            perpetuataion of sa.msaara are related.(49)Interest-
            ing to note, however, is that the fivefold ignorance
            Araa.da identifiesstorpor (tamas),delusion (moha),
            great delusion  (mahaamoha), darkness (taamisra) and
            blind  darkness (andhataamisra)become,in Saa.mkhy-
            akaarikaa XLVIII,the five viparyaya-s(errors or mis-
            apprehensions).(50)


                                    P.264


            To summarize  the  complicated  development  of  the
            gu.na-s discussed  earlier: the three gu.na-s in the
            early Saa.mkhya  of Araada are but bhaava-s, "states
            of being," each having moral qualities through which
            the unseen avyakta  attaches  a person to sa.msaara.
            The moral actions associated  with the three gu.na-s
            are  divided  into  two kinds: those  moral  actions
            containing  the  sattva  gu.na, propelling  a person
            into  higher  rebirth  (and eventual  release);  and
            those   containing   the  rajas   or  tamas   gu.na,
            perpetuating  the  cycle  of  existence.These  moral
            qualities  within  sa.msaara  have three causes, and
            these  causes  themselves  seem  to  work  by  eight
            factors that variously relate to each of them.  This
            twofold division of the three gu.na-s parallels  the
            division  and functions  of the three Buddhist roots
            of good and evil.  Liberation  is achieved  with the
            increase of sattva  (51)  and the concomitant extin-
            guishment  of rajas  and tamas, a process  similarly
            described  in parts  of the  Mahaabhaarata  and Yoga
            Suutras iii 55.
              A'svagho.sa choses not to mention  the  gu.na-s in
            Araa.da's  early  Saa.mkhya  description  apparently
            because   he  considers   them  to  be  merely   the
            'mechanism' through which avyakta attaches sa.msaara
            to  the  individual, and  their  description  is not
            considered   necessary   once  avyakta   itself   is
            mentioned.
              Apparently the gu.na-s attain their classical,cos-
            mological and psychological  significance  only when
            the term prak.rti  begins  to mean but the first  of
            twenty-four material tattva-s, and loses its meaning
            as the inclusive title of the eight tattva-s ound in
            the earlier speculation.(52)

            THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF SVABHAAVA  IN  RELATION  TO THE
            CLASSICAL  SAA.MKHYA  CONCEPTS OF PRAK.RTI, AVYAKTA,
            AND THE GU.NA-S

            Having described  in part the evolution of prak.rti,
            avyakta, and the  gu.na-s  we now  can  connect  the
            development  of these  three  entities  with that of
            svabhaava, described  earlier.  What occurs  between
            the  time  of  A'svagho.sa   and  II'svarak.r.s.na's
            classical  work is that the features of svabhaava as
            the  motive  force  behind  the  eightfold  prak.rti
            become posited as the features  within the classical
            avyakta.  In the process, the latter acquires  a new
            meaning, different  from  the  (older) notion  of it
            being  the  'unseen   force'of   the  morallaw.   In
            classical  Saa.mkhya  it now means  the  "unmanifest
            force"  in which  lie at rest the manifold  creative
            power (as gu.napari.naama) of the three gu.na-s. The
            moral qualities through which Araada's early avyakta
            worked  are  transferred  from  the  gu.na-s  of the
            earlier thought to the eightfold bhaava-s within the
            buddhi of classical thought.(53)
              While II'svarak.r.s.na  rejects the idea that sva-
            bhaava is a creative principle, the concept may have
            influenced  classical  notion  in two  other  areas.
            First, svabhaava  as" the inherent nature of things'
            becomes the term used in relation with suffering  as
            the (apparent) linkage between  puru.sa and manifest
            creation in Saa.mkhya-kaarikaa LV.(54) if there is a
            connection, thought, between svabhhava in this later

                                    P.265

            sense and the earlier  notion  of nature  underlying
            all  prak.rit, it is simply  that  now suffering  is
            what underlies all creation.
              Second, there is a quite early notion of svabhaava
            described  by A'svagho.sa  in Buddhacarita  ix 59-62
            that  may have influenced  the classical  notion  of
            gu.n-apari.naama, the  ever-varying  proportions  of
            the interacting  gu.na-s  causing the manifestations
            of  prak.rti.  In  this  descriptions, 'Suddhodana's
            counsellor  is stating  to the Boddhisattva  various
            philosophical, disputes of the day in a vain attempt
            to convince the latter to return to his home. One of
            the  materialistic   or  naturalistic   philosophies
            described  contains  a doctrine  in which  the  four
            elements (space being omitted from the usual list of
            five),(55) usually  in mutual opposition, now "group
            themselves together" according to their own inherent
            nature  (or  according  to natural  development) and
            from  the world.  One is reminded  of the  classical
            notion of the gu.na-s, whose natures  are dissimilar
            if not antagonistic, but that also interact  to from
            the  mainfest  universe.  While  indeed  there  is a
            similarity  between  these  two  ideas,  no  precise
            connection  between  the older syabhaava  notion and
            the classical  gu.napari.naama  theory  can be drawn
            with certainty.(56)

            BUDDHI

            Comparatively  little is known about buddhi prior to
            the classical  period.  One of the  few  things  the
            texts  allow us to say is that the eithtfold  buddhi
            of classical  Saa.mkhya  is not  known  in Araa.da's
            system. Furthermore, it also seems true that in some
            earlier   Saa.mkhya   systems   buddhi   should   be
            translated as "consciousness" (cetanaa)or "intellect"
            (vij~naana), and  these  meanings  contrast  to  its
            characterization  within  the  classical  school  as
            simply  "ascertainment" or  "determination"(adyavas-
            aaya[SK XXIII]). This devaluation of buddhi probably
            occurs concomitant  with the developing  idea of the
            transcendence  fo puru.sa, the latter  itself  being
            considered  conscious as opposed to those emanations
            within material creation (prak.rti  in her vyakta or
            generating  form)  which  are  unconscious.  To  fit
            within  this  classical  dualism, the conception  of
            buddhi  has  to be appropriately  modified, and  its
            adyavasaaya  designation  resulted.  However,  while
            this general outline  of the modification  of buddhi
            concept  holds true for the Mahaabhaarata, Araa.da's
            references  to buddhi are too vague to allow placing
            Araa.da's use within this scheme.(57)

            AHA.MKAARA AND AATMAN

            While  the  function  of  aha.mkaara   in  Araa.da's
            Saa.mkhya   is  difficult  to  determine,  its  very
            appearance  within  it is  important  to  note  with
            regard  to the  development  of classical  Saa.mkhya
            thought.  It translates  as 'ego'  or 'I' and is the
            cause  of the corporeal  individual's  activity.  In
            part its purpose  in early  Saa.mkhya  is to subsume
            the functions  of two other principles, mahat aatman
            (Great  Self) and jiiva aatman (individualized  self
            or  soul), both  of  which,  in  various  texts, had
            animated   the  body  and  connected   it  with  the
            transmigrating soul.(58) In the Buddhacarita, an


                                    P.266


            association involving transmigration  seems to exist
            between the aatman and aha.mkaara, as seen in one of
            the Bodhisattva's objections to Araa.da's Saa.mkhya:
            "and  as for this  imagined  abandonment  of the ego
            principle (aha.mkaara), as long as the soul (aatman)
            persists, there is no abandonment of that principle"
            (B xii, 76).(59)
            By the time of II'svarak.r.s.na's  classical system,
            the aatman  has disappeared  and  its transmigrating
            function  is assumed  by the  subtle  body  (li^nga,
            li^nga'sariira). In addition, aha.mkaara assumes the
            individual  aspects  of  aatman,(60) already  having
            been  associated  previously  with  it  (as  in  the
            Buddhacarita).

            Buddhi, Aha.mkaara, and Cosmological Speculation

            Although early Saa.mkhya (as well as early Buddhism)
            emphasizes the investigation  of the individual more
            than the cosmos, when the cosmos is considered it is
            usually done through  mythological  means.(61) So we
            find  in Buddhacarita  xii 21 that Kapila  (a famous
            Indian sage reputed to be the founder  of Saa.mkhya)
            and  his pupil  (probably  AAsuri) are  symbolic  of
            buddhi,(62) Prajaapati symbolizes aha.mkaara(63) and
            Prajaapati's  sons represent  the five elements.(64)
            Unrelated  to this  particular  set  of mythological
            figures is another set of cosmological speculations,
            also in the twelfth canto.  In Araa.da's description
            of the trances(dhyaana-s), each aruupya (attainment)
            is associated  with certain divine spheres, and such
            associations   probably   are  indicative   of  Yoga
            practices of this time.(65) It is worth noting that,
            in a similar view,there are cosmological associations
            between  the three worlds  and the three gu.na-s  in
            Saa.mkhyaakarikaa LIV. The modest conclusion that we
            can  deduce  from  this  material  is that  in early
            Saa.mkhya,  early  Yoga,  classical  Saa.mkhya,  and
            later  Yoga  there  is the  notion  that  liberation
            includes  a journey through the cosmos, probably  to
            reach a location  beyond the control of cosmological
            fate.

            ELEMENTS,  GROSS  ELEMENTS,  SUBTLE   ELEMENTS,  AND
            OBJECTS OF THE SENSES

            Two categories of principles (tattva-s) exist within
            Araa.da's Saa.mkhya  that are not found in the later
            Saa.mkhya    scheme    of   the   Saa.mkhyaakarikaa.
            II'svarak.r.s.na's  system  has not accepted  either
            the  five  objects  of the senses  (B xii 19) or the
            five  elements   (B  xii  18)  within  its  list  of
            twenty-four  material evolutes, although both groups
            are  easily  mistaken  for  being  in the  classical
            system.  Notions underlying  Araa.da's five elements
            (bhuuta-s)  space  (aakaa'sa), wind  (vaayu), fire
            (tejas), water  (ap) and  earth  (p.rthivii)   are
            less philosophically  discriminative than those upon
            which  the classical  five  gross  elements   also
            space, wind, fire, water, earth    are  based, but
            the agreement of the names themselves often obscures
            this fact. Nor do the gross elements have generative
            potential as do the earlier elements.
              Similarly, the  five  objects of the senses within
            Araa.da's  description    'sabda  (sound) ,  ruupa
            (form) ,  spar'sa  (touch),  gandha  (smell) ,  rasa
            (taste)   appear  to  be  the  same  as  the  five
            classical  subtle  elements  (tanmaatra-s), but this
            appearance


                                    P.267


            falls away with the realization that the latter five
            of the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa  are both subtle potentials
            above  the  plane  of gross  corporeality, and  also
            productive entities themselves. The early objects of
            the  senses, in contrast, are  not productive  (that
            is, nothing further is emanated  from them) and they
            exist within the material, perceptible  creations of
            the  world.  It  is true, however, that  these  four
            categories   the elements, the gross elements, the
            subtle elements, and the senseobjects   undergo  a
            complicated transformation as the early Saa.mkhya is
            evolving toward II'svarak.r.s.na's work.

            THE ELEMENTS

            Beginning  with the five elements  found within  the
            primary  matter (prak.rti) of early Saa.mkhya, their
            productive capacity can be explained by the state of
            philosophical  speculations during an era which made
            "no hard and fast distinction  between  animate  and
            inanimate,  between   material   and  spiritual,  or
            between  substance  and quality."(66) These elements
            were "cosmic forces inhering in the substances  from
            which  they  took  their  name," and it was accepted
            that   from  them   composition   of  the  secondary
            evolutes, (68) but  the  Buddhacarita  says  nothing
            about the evolutionary  process  from the primary to
            the secondary groupings.

            OBJECTS OF THE SENSES

            Five of the evloutes within Araa.da's  nonproductive
            secondary  matter  are the  objects  of the  senses,
            traditionally  known  as  sound, form, touch, smell,
            and taste.  These were the five basic  qualities  or
            attributes  perceived  by the senses.  The  lack  of
            philosophical  clarity,  however, between  substance
            and quality  meant that the material  objects of the
            world are classified  according to the qualities (of
            sound,taste,and so on) that the senses perceive.(69)
            Each sense  object  may have been "the  special  and
            sole object of one of the organs of sense," and also
            may  have  had  an  association  with  a  particular
            element.(70)
              Refinements  of thought  in the Vai'se.sika school
            could  have  stimulated   Saa.mkhya  into  modifying
            several of its components.  Vai'se.sika  established
            the relationship between the elements (earth, water,
            fire, air, and space) and their respective qualities
            (smell,  taste,  form, touch, and  sound),  and  the
            latter  group  serves   as  the  objects   of  sense
            perception.(71) These qualities existed only insofar
            as they inhered in the elements themselves, and this
            fact  probably   presented   a  problem   for  early
            Saa.mkhya thought.  In the Buddhacarita's  Saa.mkhya
            system, the objects  of the senses  have  a separate
            identity   from   the   elements   (bhuuta-s) ,  and
            Vai'se.sika   critics   could   have   argued   that
            individual  elements exist only insofar as they were
            particularized  by their inherent  qualities.  While
            early Saa.mkhya would not have accepted the premises
            of the  Vai'se.sika  argument, it nonetheless  could
            have  been  clear   that  Vai'se.sika   had  made  a
            philosophical  advance  by  distinguishing   between
            substances  and  their  qualities.  If the  elements
            produced the objects


                                    P.268


            of the senses,(72) then early Saa.mkhya  would  have
            been  hard-pressed  to explain  how  the  generative
            elements produce nongenerative entities (the objects
            of  the  senses) that  are  nothing  but  their  own
            qualities.(73)
              These Vai'se.sika developments could have influenc-
            ed classical Saa.mkhya's interpretations of both the
            elements  and their  sense objects.(74) In any case,
            the  objects  of the senses  are  removed  from  its
            cosmological scheme of twenty-four material entities,
            and  the  Saa.mkhyakaarikaa   only   makes   passing
            reference  to them as the objects  of the organs  of
            action  (SK  XXVIII   and  XXXIV) .   The  elements,
            previously  thought  to  have  been  productive, are
            reduced to unregenerative tattva-s found at the last
            stage of the emanation process.  By eliminating  the
            five  sense  objects, however,  a  vacancy  of  five
            tattva-s is created,and this vacancy is subsequently
            filled   with   a  new  fivefold   designation,  the
            tanmaatra-s  (subtle  elements) .  Within  Saa.mkhya
            speculation  this  new group  appears  for the first
            time  in the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa  and not gonly  fills
            the numerical  vacancy created  by the expulsion  of
            the  five  objects  of sense, but  also  now  has  a
            creative  potency that had been assigned  previously
            to the elements.  Its five individual members bear a
            resemblance  to the names of the five sense objects,
            but no correspondence  exists in the functioning  of
            the two. The tanmaatra-s are conceived as "extremely
            fine or subtle potentials" that combine to produce
            the corporeal world (For example,the mahaabhuuta-s).
            (75)   While   Vai'se.sika   distinguishes   between
            substances  and (among  other  things) the qualities
            and specificities(vi'se.sa-s) which inhere  in them,
            classical   Saa.mkhya   distinguishes   between  the
            nonspecific  (avi'se.sa)  subtle  elements  and  the
            specific   (vi'se.sa)  gross   elements   which  are
            generated out of them.

            SUMMARY: ELEMENTS  OBJECTS  OF  THE  SENSES,  SUBTLE
            ELEMENTS, AND GROSS ELEMENTS

            Having thus suggested a possible explanation for the
            appearance  of the classical Saa.mkhya  tanmaatra-s,
            we  can  now  understand  the  complex  relationship
            between  Araa.da's  elements  and the objects of the
            senses and II'svarak.r.s.na's  subtle  elements  and
            gross  elements.  The early Saa.mkhya  elements  are
            found within  the eightfold  creative  prak.rti, the
            latter  generating   the  sixteen  constituents   of
            secondary  matter  through  its underlying  inherent
            nature of svabhaava.  At this stage of philosophical
            thought, no difference is made between substance and
            quality, so no scrutiny of the substantive nature or
            corporeality   of  the  elemental  concept  has  yet
            occurred, as  will  happen  within  the  Vai'se.sika
            school, In a manner which is not entirely clear, the
            five  sense  objcets  (along  with the other  eleven
            tattva-s  of secondary  matter) are  generated  from
            prak.rti,  and  each  of  the  five  seems  to  have
            particular  relationships  not only  with the senses
            but also with individual elements.
              This early Saa.mkhya scheme may have been affected
            by  the  Vai'se.sika   analysis  of  substance   and
            quality.  As a logical consequence of this analysis,
            the general acceptance  of the elements as corporeal
            substances may have stimulated


                                   P.269


            Saa.mkhya  to remove from them not only their status
            as  primary  tattva-s   but  also  their  previously
            assigned generative capacities. At the same time the
            five objects  of the senses are no longer considered
            substantive   entities   but  rather  qualities   or
            attributes  of substantive  entities  that give them
            their specific characteristics.
              The  necessary  adjustments  are  made within  the
            classical  system  by  eliminating  the  five  sense
            objects  and relegating  the elements  to the lowest
            position  in the evolutionary  process  a position
            indicative  of their corporeal  and gross substance.
            The five vacancies  created by the exclusion  of the
            sense objects  are filled by the subtle  elements, a
            new  group   within   Saa.mkhya   speculation   that
            necessarily   assumes   the  creative   capabilities
            previously held by the elements and that allows them
            to serve  as the generative  source  for  the  gross
            elements.

            THE KNOWER  OF THE  FIELD  (K.SETRAJ~NA), PURUSA,AND
            AATMAN

            The soul or Soul is regarded  both as aatman  (B xii
            20 and 81), and the knower of the field (k.setraj~na
            [B xii 20 and 80]), an association  also  common  in
            the  Mahaabhaarata.(76)  In  Araa.da's  system  both
            terms have individual  and cosmic  significance,(77)
            but their  exact  meaning  is unclear.  One  way  to
            explain thdir difference is to regard aatman usually
            as  the  "cosmic  soul"  and  k.setraj~na  as  "that
            portion  of the cosmic soul that is attached  to the
            individual."(78) The difficulty  becomes, of course,
            understanding   exactly  what  the  relationship  is
            between the individual and cosmic soul.
              The best clue regarding the difference is given in
            Buddhacarita  xii  80-81, in which  the  aatman  (as
            soul) is understood  to be unknowing (aj~na) and the
            knower  of the  field  (k.setraj~na) to  be  knowing
            (j~na).  Presumably this knowing is in regard to the
            field  of primary  and  secondary  evolutes, and the
            soul's true separation from it.

              Earlier, in  Buddhacarita  xii  65, there exists a
            description  of the liberated  knower  of the  field
            (k.setraj~na) as "that  supreme  Absolute  (parama.m
            brahma) ,  without   attribute,   everlasting,   and
            immutable".  Two  verses  earlier, the  term  "self"
            (aatman)  is  used   enigmatically:  "But   another,
            skilled in regard to the inner self, causes his self
            to cease  by his self  and since  he sees  there  is
            nothing, he is declared  to be one for whom  nothing
            exists" (B xii 63). In this passage, the last of the
            'selves'  seems to be equated with the knower of the
            field  in xii 64, and it is the latter  who achieves
            liberation.
              Several things  need to  be said about these three
            enigmatic  verses  (B  xii  63-65) in an attempt  to
            clarify Araa.da's  use of aatman and k.setraj~na  in
            the  early  Saa.mkhya  sections.  To begin, it seems
            that  the  term  k.setraj~na  is the name  given  to
            aatman, when, as it gains liberation, it 'knows  the
            field'  of creation.  Prior to liberation, aatman is
            aj~na, unknowing (B xii 80-81).(79)
              Next,I take the three references to "self" in Bud-
            dhacarita  xii 63 to mean that the cosmic, 'knowing'
            self associated with Brahman causes the individual's
            inmost psychological  nature  or essence, 'the inner
            self', to cease its notion of a


                                    P.270


            'personality' self. Finally, the supreme Absolute is
            not to be taken  as a cosmic  being but rather  as a
            cosmic  condition  of mok.sa.  Sen Gupta points  out
            that had this term been understood  as indicating  a
            supreme  God, the Bodhisattva  certainly  would have
            criticized  the theory on these grounds.(80) Keeping
            all of this in mind, I reinterpret Buddhacarita  xii
            63 to mean, "But another, skilled  in regard  to the
            cosmic aatman, causes his unknowing self to cease by
            his k.setraj~na...."
              Of  significance  for  the  later  doctrine of the
            classical  puru.sa  is that  the difference  between
            k.setra and k.setraj~na  explicitly foreshadows  the
            classical dualism. Furthermore, the unknowing aatman
            and the knowing  k.setraj~na  are  reflected  in the
            classical   doctrines   of   the   deluded   puru.sa
            'apparently'  entangled in matter and the witnessing
            puru.sa  conscious  of its separate  nature from it.
            The  descriptions   of  the  supreme   Absolute   in
            Buddhacarita xii 65 ("without attribute, everlasting
            and  immutable")  resemble   those  of  puru.sa   in
            Saa.mkhyakaarikaa  XIX  (possessed  of isolation  or
            freedom,  inactive, and  indifferent).  Finally, the
            similarity  between the individual  k.setraj~na  and
            the individual puru.sa-s is striking.
              Of course there are significant differences between
            Araa.da's and II'svarak.r.s.na's school.The classical
            scheme  is much  more  insistent  on the ontological
            separation of puru.sa and prak.rti than is the early
            separation  between  k.setraj~na  and  k.setra.  One
            suspects   that,  to   an  adherent   of   classical
            Saa.mkhya, even the statement in Buddhacarita xii 64
            that  liberation  occurs  when  the  "knower  of the
            field...escape[s]  the body" would be considered  to
            have unjustly  compromised  the absolute  separation
            between the material and the nonmaterial principles.
            (81) Furthermore, the term aatman does not appear in
            the  Saa.mkhya-kaaikaa,its transmigrating and indiv-
            idualizing  functions  having  been  assumed  by the
            subtle body and aha.mkaara, respectively.

            THE BODHISATTVA'S  REJECTION  OF ARAA.DA'S SAA.MKHYA
            SYSTEM

            All  of the Bodhisattva's  refutations  of Araa.da's
            Saa.mkhya  doctrines  challenge, in  some  way,  the
            existence of the soul (aatman).  Within this overall
            framework,  the  Bodhisattva's   arguments   can  be
            divided  into two categories: those  describing  the
            necessary continuation of samsar-ic potencies within
            an  aatman;  and  those  which  criticize  Araa.da's
            notion of knowledge.  Regarding the continuation  of
            samsar-ic    potencies   within   an   aatman,   the
            Bodhisattva  begins  his refutation  by saying  that
            when the k.setraj~na  achieves his separation  "from
            the primary and secondary constituents" (B xii, 70),
            the inactivity of the mind, and the longevity of the
            state itself create the "imagination" of it being an
            eternal  condition  (B xii, 74).  However, the three
            causes (hetu-s) of karman and transmigration   the
            power  of the  act, ignorance, and  desire   still
            "remain  in a subtle state"  within the soul (B xii,
            74) ,  since   the  latter   contains   the  "causal
            conditions"  in which  they grow.  Consequently, the
            soul  itself  is  described  as  "a seed"  for  both
            further  transmigration  and further  karman  (B xii
            70-71). Inevitably the soul will find " that it will
            again become bound from the continued  existence  of
            causal  conditions"  (B  xii  71).  Furthermore, the
            Bodhisattva    asserts    that   the   ego-principle
            (aha.mkaara,


                                    P.271


            probably  used  in its animating  and transmigrating
            sense  described  earlier) persists  as long as does
            the soul (B xii, 76).(82)
              The  next set of  three arguments  are those which
            are directed  at the Saa.mkhya  notion of knowledge,
            each  of the three  addressing  a different  meaning
            related  to the word "knowledge"  itself.  The first
            argument   located  "knowledge"   as  "reason"   and
            criticizes  the Saa.mkhya liberation  by saying that
            since  the "activity  of reason"  is an attribute, a
            soul that possesses  such  an attribute  necessarily
            becomes  identified  with  it, just  as  a  fire  is
            identified with its attributes of outward appearance
            and  heat.   Liberation,  therefore,  has  not  been
            achieved (B xii 77-78).(83) What is at issue here is
            whether  the knower  of the field  ever can separate
            permanently  from its field, and the Bodhisattva  is
            claiming that the k.setraj~na cannot.
            The  Bodhisattva  continues  along  these  lines  by
            stating  that  the very  nature  of a k.setraj~na, a
            knower  of the field, necessitates  that there  be a
            k.setra, a field  for it ot know, and this necessity
            of an orientation to a field precludes the knower of
            the field from ever being released permanently  from
            it (B.  xii 79-80). The Bodhisattva has not accepted
            the claim Araa.da  made that the knower of the field
            obtains freedom from " the rushing  torrent of birth
            and death" (B.  xii 41) by "properly" discriminating
            the "mind, voice, intellect, and action" (B, xii 31)
              that  is, "that  which  lacks  intelligence, the
            seen"   from "the intelligent....the  unseen"  (B.
            xii 40) . The Bodhisattva responds that discrimina-
            tion  is not enough  for  a soul  to gain  permanent
            liberation, since its necessary  orientation  to the
            field  of existence  invariably  draws  it into  the
            cycle of transmigration.(84)
              The final  argument  against Araa.da's  liberation
            scheme is directed against the soul in its aatman or
            unknowing  state.  The Bodhisattva  charges that the
            existence  of the quality  of unknowing  need not be
            established  through the existence of an aatman that
            lacks knowledge.  As is the case with common things,
            like logs or walls, "the quality  of not-knowing  is
            well established"  without them having an aatman (B.
            xii 81).  When combined  with the previous  argument
            about  the  impossibility   of  a  k.setraj~na  ever
            gaining  complete   release   from  its  field,  the
            Bodhisattva  seems  to be saying  that, if Araa.da's
            liberation  system involves a change occurring  from
            an unknowing  to a knowing state, then neither state
            requires  that  an aatman  exist  for the change  to
            occur.
              Nonetheless,  the conclusion reached through  each
            of these arguments is that everything  resembling  a
            doctrine of a soul has to be abandoned  before there
            will be assurance  that liberation  from matter will
            be permanent.  Beyond knowledge  of the field is the
            complete "abandonment of everything" (B. xii 82).

            SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

            A'svagho.sa,  through  the  character   of  Araa.da,
            describes  an early Saa.mkhya that on certain points
            has basic affinities  with various  other  Saa.mkhya
            descriptions  dating around the first centuries C.E.
            It  is a Saa.mkhya  of  twenty-five  principles, one
            principle   standing   rather   separate   from  the
            twenty-four material tattva-s(prin-


                                    P.272


            ciples.) This material group of twenty-four tattva-s
            is divided into primary and secondary forms. Primary
            matter, called prak.rti, is thought to be eightfold,
            and consists of avyakta, buddhi, aba.mkaara, and the
            five bhuta-s (elements). From these eight principles
            are  produced  the  sixteen  tattva-s  of  secondary
            matter, called vikaara (a production or derivative).
            (Unfortunately   the  text  does  not  describe  the
            specifics  as to how this generation  takes  place.)
            These sixteen tattva-s include the usual five senses
            plus a sixth, manas (mind) (as was typical  for this
            period  of Indian  thought), the five sense objects,
            and the hands and feet, the voice, and the organs of
            generation  and excretion  (elsewhere  known  as the
            karmendriya-s, the  organs  of action).  All sixteen
            are considered to be uncreative and ungenerative.
              Underlying  the eightfold  prak.rti is a principle
            called  svabhaava,  which  is  thought   to  be  the
            (inherent) nature by which the eightfold prak.rti is
            creative and generative.By the time of the classical
            scheme, the  notion  of  a nature  (or  an  inherent
            nature) causing  the  creation  of the universe  has
            become posited  in the avyakta, which as "unmanifest
            force"  carried  a different  meaning  than does the
            first tattva of early Saa.mkhya, avyakta  as "unseen
            force."   This  inherent   nature   that   motivates
            generativity  within  classical  Saa.mkhya  does  so
            through the three gu.na-s, and by having these three
            exist  within  avyakta,  the  latter  obtains   both
            attributes   and  characteristics,  making  it  more
            plausible  as the source of all creation.  The basic
            scheme,  however, of  a  horizontal  emanation  that
            exists  in  early  Saa.mkhya's   eightfold  prak.rti
            reappears in the classical system's emanations  from
            aha.mkaara of the karmendriya-s, the buddhiindriya-s,
            manas, and the tanmatra-s.
              While  A'svagho.sa  does  not  mention  the  three
            gu.na-s  in  canto  xii,  his  omission  simply  may
            indicate  that  at this  early  stage  they  are not
            considered  to  be  significant  in the  process  of
            creation.  The gu.na-s are conceived to be the three
            bhaava-s,  states   of  being,  having   the   moral
            qualities   through  which  avyakta  (unseen  force)
            attaches  a person  to  sa.msaara.  The  gu.na-s, as
            moral qualities  in this text, are divided  into two
            groups: those  qualities  and actions  of the sattva
            gu.na  that lead to higher  rebirths  (and  eventual
            release);  and those  qualities  and actions  of the
            rajas  and tamas gu.na-s  that lead to lower births.
            In  this  twofold  division  one  can  see  concepts
            similar to the Buddhist  roots of good (=sattva) and
            evil  (=rajas  and  tamas) which  also  determine  a
            person's condition of rebirth.
              The cause or causes of sa.msaara are unclear,since
            Araa.da  gives three different  causal  schemes, and
            the schemes  themselves  cannot  be linked together.
            First, he claims the causes of sa.msaara to be wrong
            knowledge (aj~naana), power of the act (karman), and
            desire  or  craving  (t.r.s.naa),  and  these  three
            causes themselves  function by eight factors.  Next,
            he attributes transmigration to a fivefold ignorance,
            and  immediately  follows  by saying  that  a person
            "wanders in the cycle of transmigration"  because of
            his false identification with corporeal individuality.
              Early  Saa.mkhya  salvation is  thought of  as the
            increase    of   sattva    with    an   accompanying
            extinguishment  of  rajas  and  tamas.   The  Buddha
            criticizes this


                                    P.273


            Saa.mkhya  notion  of release  by saying that if all
            three gu.na-s  were permanent  entities, then sattva
            could not destroy the other two, which thereby makes
            release impossible  to achieve.  Buddhism avoids the
            difficulty of permanent but non-liberating  entities
            by describing  the individual  as being composed  of
            five  impermenant  skandha-s,  but  one  notes  with
            interest  that, with  the exception  of avyakta, the
            early Saa.mkhya primary and secondary emanations can
            be correlated with them.
              Having  mentioned briefly  the  evolution of early
            avyakta into the classical tattva-s of the same name
            but  different  internal  forces, we can  say little
            about  two of the remaining  seven  tattva-s  of the
            early  period,  buddhi  and  aha.mkaara.   From  the
            Mahaabhaarata  we know  that  buddhi  may have  been
            thought  to be consciousness  (cetanaa) or intellect
            (vij~naana),  conceptualizations  that  have  to  be
            modified  within  the  classical  system  so  as  to
            maintain the unconscious  nature of prak.rti and her
            evolutes.
              Aha.mkaara(ego) probably has some association with
            attaching an animating principle to an individualiz-
            ed transmigrating  soul.  In the classical period it
            fully  subsumes  the individual  aspects  of aatman,
            while the transmigrating  aspects  of the latter are
            posited within the subtle body.  Finally, aha.mkaara
            and  buddhi   in  Araada's   system   probably   has
            applicability   more  to  notions   concerning   the
            individual than to the cosmos, since when the cosmos
            is referred  to it is done only through mythological
            figures.   Within   the   classical   system   their
            cosmological significance is expanded.
              Concerning the remaining  five of the eight  early
            tattva-s  of  prak.rti   the  five  elements   a
            considerable  amount  can be said.  In the classical
            system  they are not creative  principles, and their
            closest   approximation   is  the  five   uncreative
            principles  lowest  in  the  emanation  process, the
            mahabhuuta-s.   Their   demotion   to   ungenerative
            tattva-s   might   have  occurred   under  the  same
            influence   that   also  might   have   caused   the
            disappearance  of the  five  sense  objects  in  the
            Saa.mkhyakaarikaa  emanation  scheme:  the  critical
            examination  of the difference between substance and
            qualities undertaken in the Vai'se.sika school.  The
            pressures  that could have been felt as a result  of
            this examination  could  have affected  not only the
            new   interpretation   of  the   elements   as  mere
            substances  within  II'svarak.r.s.na's  system,  but
            also the removal  from the emanation  scheme  of the
            five sense  objects  as a consequence  of their  new
            status as nothing but qualities or attributes of the
            organs of action  (karmendriya-s).  In the numerical
            places  of the early elements  are posited  the five
            subtle elements  (tanmaatra-s), and this replacement
            allows  classical  Saa.mkhya  to both  maintain  the
            tradition  of twenty-five  tattva-s  and provide the
            mahabhuuta-s with a generative source.
              While  the  distinction  within  Araa.da's  system
            betweem  k.setraj~na   and  aatman  is  not  clearly
            delineated, it appears  that the latter  is the term
            applied  to the former  when aatman  is still within
            the influence of sa.msaara. This distinction that is
            made between k.setraj~na  (knower  of the field) and
            k.setra (the field of matter) is a precursor  to the
            classical dualism between puru.sa and prak.rti.


                                    P.274


              The Bodhisattva's rejection of Araa.da's Saa.mkhya
            notion   of   liberation    concentrates    on   the
            difficulties  with  the postulation  of a soul.  The
            first set of refutations address the question of the
            subtle samsar-ic  potencies  of the three hetu-s and
            aha.mkaara  within  a k.setraj~na.  The next  set of
            refutations  criticize various notions of knowledge.
            One attack  is against  the  notion  of a liberating
            knowledge  that is either  one of "reasoning"  or of
            "knowing  the field  of matter," since  both qualify
            the eternal  nature  of the liberated  state  due to
            their necessary  external orientation  to an entity.
            The other attack  implies  that a state of unknowing
            exists independently of an aatman, just as the state
            of  salvific   knowing   exists   independently   of
            k.setraj~na.In the final analysis, only the complete
            abandonment  of  everything  ensures  complete  land
            eternal liberation.


                                    NOTES

              1. E.h. Johnston, The Buddhacarita:or, The Acts of
            the  Buddha   Part   I,  Sanskrit   Text;   Part  II
            translation, cantos  I-XIV.  (1936;  reprint  Delhi:
            Motilal  Banarsidass, 1972).  All English renditions
            of  these  cantos, as  well  as  references  to  the
            introductory  remarks (indicated by Roman numerals),
            are from Part II.  Translation  of cantos  XV-XXVIII
            are from the Tibetan, Acta Orientalia, XV.
              2. Araa.da (Pali, A.laara Kaalaama) was, according
            to tradition, one of Gautama's  teachers  after  the
            Bodhisattva's  renunciation.  Of the various sketchy
            accounts  of his  teachings, only  the  Buddhacarita
            indicates that his doctrines resembled Saa.mkhya-yoga.
            Even  then, the dhyaana-s  to which  Araa.da  refers
            were  Buddhist, not  orthodox  Yoga, in nature.  See
            G.P.  Malalasekara, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names,
            I(London: Luzac and Co.,1960), p.297;  also Indumate
            Karunartne, "AA.laara  Kaalaama, "  Encyclopedia  of
            Buddhism, ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Fascicule A-ACA (n.
            p.: Government  of  Ceylon, n.d.), p.378;  Biswanath
            Bhattacharya, A'svagho.sa: A  Critical  Study  (West
            Bengal: Santiniketan, 1976),pp.403-409.
              3. The term "saa.mkhya" itself appears in Mok.sad-
            harma  12.228.27, 28,36:12.232.1  (in  reference  to
            12.231.5);  12.289.4-5;  and 12.290.59-60.  So cites
            Franklin  Edgerton  in  The  Beginnings   of  Indian
            Philosophy  (Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,
            1965),p.36,n.2.Elsewhere  appear references  to "the
            path  of knowledge"  and  descriptions  of emanation
            systems that are Saa.mkhya in nature.
              4. B pp.lvi-lvii; 172, n.33.Gerald Larson, however,
            says Johnston's claim that the common source was the
            Vaar.saga.nya  school  is based  upon weak evidence.
            For Larson's detailed  discussion  see his Classical
            Saa.mkhya (Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), pp.109,
            151-155.
              5. Edgerton, ibid., indicates that the term "saa.-
            mkhya: appears in the Bhagavadgiitaa at ii.39, iii.3
            v.4-5.  References  to  the  system, however, appear
            elsewhere  in the text, even though  the term itself
            is not used.  See  Franklin  Edgerton, The  Bhagavad
            Giitaa (1944; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University
            Press, 1972), pp. 196-198;R.C.Zaehner, The Bhagavad-
            Giitaa  (New York: Oxford  University  Press, 1973),
            pp.139-141  203.  An interesting  interpretation  of
            Saa.mkhya  in the  Bhagavadgiitaa  is David  White's
            "Proto-Saa.mkhya   and  Advaita   Vedaanta   in  the
            Bhagavadgiitaa,  "  Philosophy  East  and  West  29,
            no.4(October, 1979): 501-507.
              6. Johnston  believes that the older parts  of the
            Bhagavadgiitaa  could  have  been  in  existence  in
            A'svagho.sa's  day, having  dated  the poet's  works
            from "between 50 B.C.and 100 A.D., with a preference
            for   the  first   century   A.D."   (B.,  p.xvii) .
            Bhattacharya,  Asvagho.sa,  p.19,  places  the  poet
            "about 100 A.D."
              7. Larson,Classical Sa.mkhya,p.242. Dasgupta dates
            the Caraka  Sa.mhitaa  at 70 A.D.  S.N.  Dasgupta, A
            History  of  Indian  Philosophy,  I(1922;   reprint,
            London: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p.213.
              8. For a  critique of the Saa.mkhya system  within
            the  Caraka  Sa.mhitaa,  see  Dasgupta,  History  of
            Indian Philosophy, pp.213-217.

     

                                    P.275


              9. For a brief but informative discussion  of  the
            most obvious instances  of Saa.mkhya metaphysics  in
            the Upani.sads, see Robert Ernest Hume, The Thirteen
            Principal  Upanishads  (2d  ed.  1931;  reprint, New
            York: Oxford  University  Press, 1971), pp.8-9.  The
            term "saa.mkhya-yoga" appears in 'Svet. U.6.13.
              10. On the meaning of the word "Saa.mkhya : Edger-
            ton  says  "it  is  the  rationalizing,  reflective,
            speculative  philosphical method.....[the]  'reason-
            method'.  It seems  a natural  term to describe  the
            method of gaining salvation by 'knowledge'" (Beginn-
            ings, p.36).
              11. All quotes from classical Saa.mkhya are  taken
            from Larson's translation  of the Saa.mkhya Kaarikaa
            (SK).
              12. Eliade  dates the  Saa.mkhyakaarikaa as  being
            not  later  than  the  5th  century  C.E.  Dasgupta,
            however, dates it to about 200 C.E.Larson  says that
            the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa  was translated  into  Chinese
            between  557-569  C.E., so we can presume  that  the
            original  existed  before  then.  See Mircea Eliade,
            Patanjali and Yoga, trans.  Charles Lam Markham (New
            York: Schocken Books, 1975), p.16; Dasgupta, History
            of Indian  Philosophy, p.212;  and Larson, Classical
            Sa.mkhya, p.4.
              13. Franklin  Edgerton, " The  Meaning of Saankhya
            and  Yoga, " American Journal of Philosophy 45, no.1
            (1924): 32, see pp.36f; also Beginnings, pp.36-39.
              14. See Larson,Classical Sa.mkhya, pp.128-139, esp.
            pp.133-136.
              15. Larson, Classical Sa.mkhya, p.133.
              16. The dhyaana-s which Araa.da describes are ones
            that,  with  a  single  exception, a  Buddhist  monk
            achieves.  On the claim  that the Saa.mkhya  and the
            Yoga  of the Buddhacarita do not represent  distinc-
            tive schools but are two aspects of the same school,
            see  Larson,  Classical  Sa.mkhya,  p.130.   On  the
            relationship  between  orthodox  Yoga  and  Buddhist
            dhyaana-s, including  the ones described  by Araada,
            see: Malalasekara, Dictionary, p.297;  Louis  de  la
            Valle'e  Poussin,  "Le  Bouddhisme  et  le  Yoga  de
            Patanjali,  "  M'elanges   Chinois   et  Bouddhiques
            (1936-1937), pp.228-230.
              17. Johnston  divides  early Saa.mkhya into  three
            chronological periods-an atheistic stage, a theistic
            stage,  and  another  atheistic  stage.  Larson,  in
            contrast, prefers  to avoid a chronological  scheme,
            and instead  wishes "simply  to point to the various
            strands or traditions of speculation and to show how
            they come together in the later texts of the period"
            (p.139).  For the purposes  of this article, we have
            adopted an approach  similar to Larson's.  See: E.H.
            Johnston, Early  Saa.mkhya  (1937;  reprint,  Delhi:
            Motilal Banarsidass, 1974),pp.80-87.
              18. E.H.Johnston, The Saundarananda: or, Nanda the
            Fair (London:Oxford University Press, 1932).
              19. All  references to the  Yoga  Suutras will  be
            taken from: James Haughton Woods, The Yoga System of
            Pata~njali, Harvard  Oriental  Series, vol.17 (1914;
            reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972).
              20. The sages listed by Araa.da are similarly cited
            in the Mahaabhaarata  as being  Saa.mkhya  teachers.
            K.B.Ramakrishna   Rao,  "The  Buddhacarita  and  the
            Saa.mkhya   of  Araa.da  Kaalaama, "  Adyar  Library
            Bulletin 28 (1964): 232.
              21. On the development of the term 'aatman' in the
            Upani.sads,see Hume,The Thirteen Principal Upanisads,
            pp.23-32.
              22. For  a discussion of the development  of  this
            term  within  the  context  of  the  Upani.sads, the
            Mahaabhaarata, and the Bhagavadgiitaa, see  Zaehner,
            The Bhagavad-Giitaa, pp.333-335. The earliest use of
            the term is 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad 6.16, where it
            appears to be "an alternate  word for the puru.sa of
            the Saa.mkhya system" (p.333). For its appearance in
            the Mahaabhaarata  and the Pa~ncaraatra  system, see
            Johnston, Early, pp.44-45.
              23. In Edgerton's translation of  Mbh. 12.298, the
            generation  of  a  twenty-four   principle  material
            nature,   similar   to   Araa.da's,  is   described.
            Beginning  with the avyakta, each of the tattva-s of
            prak.rti  emanate  out of the previous  one, and the
            objects  of the sense  emanate  out of the elements.
            The rest of the process is jumbled.  See Beginnings,
            pp.323-324.
              24. Compare SK XIX.
              25. As  a consequence of the  Tibetan and  Chinese
            words  used for "nature," there  is some  linguistic
            difficulty determining whether the original Sanskrit
            word was prak.rti  or svabhaava, but the context  of
            the argument  leads Johnston  to decide  firmly upon
            the latter. See Early, pp.70-71; also Bvg. v.14.


                                    P.276


              26. Johnston, B, p.lvix; Early, pp.70-71.
              27. Johnston,  Early,  p.70. Put  differently, the
            debate  here  is over  the  consturction  of  causal
            chains of existence within early Indian speculation.
            Karl  H.Potter  points  out that these  chains  were
            areas of contention  between the different  schools.
            See  his  Presuppositions  of  India's  Philosophies
            (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963),
            pp.106-111.
              28. SK X: "The manifest (vyakta) is caused,finite,
            nonpervasive, active supported  emergent, composite,
            dependent.   The   unmanifest   (avyakta)   is   the
            opposite." SK XI; (Both) the manifest and unmanifest
            are (characterized  by the) three gu.na-s (qualities
            or 'strands'); undiscriminating, objective; general;
            nonconscious;   productive;   the  puru.sa   is  the
            opposite  of them, although  similar (to the avyakta
            as characterized in vs.X.).
              29. Johnston,  Early,  p.71.  This is not to  say,
            though, that  the  Saa.mkhyakaarikaa  belief  in the
            gu.na-s'  functions  is in  any  way  a response  to
            A'svagho.sa.
              30. Johnston, Early, p.69. Compare B,p. lvii, how-
              31. Larson,Classical Saa.mkhya, pp.113, 174;J.A.B.
            van Buitenen.  "Studies  in Samkhya, II," Journal of
            the American Oriental Society 77 (1957): 22-23;  see
            SK XXV.
              32. Johnston, B,p. lviii. He cites the meanings of
            gu.na  in  the  epic  verses  as:  (a)  "  'quality'
            generally, "  (b)  "objects  of  the  senses, "  (c)
            "anything  evolved, which is described as a gu.na of
            that from which it is evolved," (d)" qualities which
            serve  to distinguish  the  varieties  of the  three
            gu.nas of prak.rti";  and (e) "the gu.nas themselves
            " [as they are known in the classical scheme].
              33. Johnston, B lvii. Johnston's interpretation of
            the early Saa.mkhya gu.na-s in the Mahaabhaarata  as
            having solely moral functions  is challenged  by Van
            Buitenen, who claims  instead  that the gu.na-s  had
            cosmic,   evolutionary   meaning.    See   J.A.B.van
            Buitenen, "Studies  in  Samkhya, I"  Journal  of the
            American  Oriental  Society  76(1956): 153, 155-156.
            Larson,   however,   correctly    synthesizes    van
            Buitenen's and Johnston's views (see pp.116-120). We
            can still accept, therefore, Johnston's  discussion,
            at least as it applies to the Buddhacarita.
              34. Johnston, B, p.lix.
              35. Although  A'svagho.sa never mentions the three
            roots  of good per se, Johnston  infers  term from B
            ii, 56; xii, 68; and S, v.  17, where hetu works for
            good and not evil. See Johnston, B,p.xlii.
              36. On this parallel,see Johnston,Early, pp.36-37.
            Edgerton,   in   his   Buddhist    Hybrid   Sanskrit
            Dictionary, cites  (s.v.) one  of the  Aku'salamuula
            slightly  differently  from  Johnston;   'replacing'
            raaga  with its synonym, lobha (desire, longing  for
            greed) .  Consequently,  the  three  roots  of  good
            (ku'salamula) that Edgerton  cites (s.v.) are alobha
            (non-desire) ,  adve.sa   (non-enmity) ,  and  amoha
            (non-delusion  of  mind,  non-ignorance) .  Franklin
            Edgerton,  Buddhist   Hybrid  Sanskrit  Grammar  and
            Dictionary, 2  vols.  (1953, reprint, Delhi: Motilal
            Banarsidass,  1970).  On  the  relationship  between
            rajas and raaga see J.A. B.van Buitenen, "Studies in
            Saa.mkhya, III," Journal  of the  American  Oriental
            Society 77(1957): 93.
              37. Johnston, B, pp.101-102, n. 53. On the concept
            of rajas  and tamas as a collective  entity, see van
            Buitenen, "Studies in Samkhya, III," p.100.
              38. Johnston, B, pp. xli-xlii.
              39. Johnston points out that "within the Saa.mkhya
            range  of  ideas, "  the  meaning   of  moha  "bears
            resemblance  to the  delusion  of puru.sa, by which,
            when in contact  with prak.rti, imagines, though  it
            is really  a separate  entity, it is identical  with
            it." "Some  Saa.mkhya  and Yoga  Conceptions  of the
            'Svetaa'svatara  Upani.sad," Journal  of  the  Royal
            Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1930):
            860.
              40. Johnston, B, p.xlii.He claims that this is not
            true in the later Abhidharma.  For Nikaaya  examples
            of the calming or suppressing  of one's lower nature
            or  passions,  and  the  refinement  of  one's  good
            nature, see Sa.myutta Nikaaya 1,5,8; xlvii, III, II,
            V; XLVII, III, v, vii, and so on.
              41. Johnston, B, pp.xlii-xliii. For the choice  of
            the meditational subject best designed to overcome a
            person's most active evil, see S, xvi, 53-67.
              42. See Early,pp.35-36. On the complementary roles
            of Saa.mkhya  and Yoga in the Mahaabhaarata  and the
            Bhagavadgiitaa, see Edgerton, Beginnings, p.38;  and
            "Meaning."  On the  opposition  between  sattva  and
            raaga, see B vii 53.  For a discussion on the belief
            that  the purification  of sattva  is tantamount  to
            release, see  van  Buitenen, "Studies  in Saa.mkhya,
            III," pp. 98-99.
              43. This argument could not have been used against
            II'svarak.r.s.n.a's    Saa.mkhya,   however,   since
            "neither  sattva  as an  independent  principle  nor
            sattva  as  emancipation   for  the  individual  are
            doctrines  held  by  classical  Saa.mkhya.   We  can
            conjecture  that,  with  the  radical  otherness  of
            puru.sa in


                                    P.277


            II'svarak.r.s.na's  atheistic  work, sattva could at
            best  play  only  a major  role  in the  process  of
            emancipation, but could not be emancipation  itself.
            The necessary adjustment is made by making the means
            of  emancipation  be  an  acquisition  of  knowledge
            through a bhaava composed of sattva; ie., the bhaava
            j~naana..., while still insisting  that emancipation
            lie beyond  anything  to be found in prak.rti, where
            sattva  and  the  other  gu.na-s  existed."  Stephen
            A.Kent,  "Valentinian   Gnosticism   and   Classical
            Saa.mkhya: A Thematic  and  Sturctural  Study"  (Ann
            Arbor, Michigan: University  of  Michigan  Microfilm
            service, 1978), p.43  (M.A.thesis).  On the role  of
            sattva in classical Saa.mkhya's  liberation  scheme,
            see Stephen  A.  Kent, "Valentinian  Gnosticism  and
            Classical   Saa.mkhya:  A  Thematic  and  Sturctural
            Comparison," Philosophy East and West 30,no.2(April,
            1980):251-252.
              44. Johnston, B, pp. xli-xliii; see Potter,Presup-
            positions, pp.102,103,112-113.
              45. Johnston, Early, p.21.
              46. ibid.
              47. See Johnston, B, p.170,n.24.
              48. On Araada's equating the fivefold ignorance to
            the  five do.sa-s (faults) , see Johnston, B, p.172,
            n.34; Johnston, "Some," pp.862,873; compare YS ii.3.
              49. See Johnston, B, p.lx.
              50. Larson,p.111. For a valuable discussion of the
            rajas-ic and tamas-ic  elements  within the fivefold
            ignorance and the relationship  between the fivefold
            ignorance  and  the  rajas/tamas  grouping, see  van
            Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya, III," pp.100-101.
              51. See Johnston, Early, p.35.
              52. Johnson,B,p.lviii.The use of the term"prak.rti"
            in classical  Saa.mkhya  can be confusing, since  it
            often  appears  as the general  title  for 'matter'.
            When  the creation  process  is in progree, however,
            'prak.rti' means but the 'starting point' from which
            the gu.na-s  activate, and it is in this sense  that
            the term is used here.
              53. Johnston, Early, pp.69,71-72. On p.72  he also
            states  that  Araa.da's   Saa.mkhya   is  the  final
            developmental stage before the important association
            of avyakta with prak.rti (for example, the classical
            notion) was  made.  Furthermore, he  says  that  the
            svabhaava  theory  could  only  have  been  held  by
            anii'svara  (atheistic) Saa.mkhya  schools  that did
            not accept an II'svara  as being the creative  force
            of the world. In theistic, ii'svara systems, such as
            the 'Svet.U., "the ii'svara himself has the function
            of creation  and  the necessity  for a principle  of
            svabhaava, separate  from prak.rti and setting it in
            motion  does  not arise, and accordingly  the use of
            the term in such systems is not frequent."
              54. SK LV: "the puru.sa,which is conscious,attains
            there the suffering  made by decay and death;  until
            deliverance of the subtle body; therefore, suffering
            is of the nature  of things  (svabhaava)." Johnston,
            in contrast, claims  that  the (apparent?)connection
            between puru.sa and the manifest  world is explained
            in the Yoga Sutras as being accidental (naimittika).
            See   Johnson,  B,  p.lx;   and   Vaacaspatimi'sra's
            explanation of YS.  ii.17 in Woods, The Yoga System,
            p.142.
              55. Bix. 59-62 only mentions the elements fire and
            water, but the process  by which  they  coalesce  is
            still clear. In Early, p.67, Johnston identifies the
            group  holding   this  materialistic   view  as  the
            bhuutacintakas  of the Mahaabhaarata (12.224.50, see
            12.229.2ff)  and  who  are  better   known   as  the
            Kvabhaavavaadins.
              56. Johnston, Early, p.67. On p.69  he also claims
            that the classical  gu.napari.naama  theory might be
            borrowed"from   the  Yoga  form  of  Saa.mkhya, "  a
            reference to the Bhaa.sya on YS iii.13(in Woods, The
            Yoga System, p.213).
              57. Johnston, Early, p.60, see  p.72; B, p.lix-lx.
            Also see van Buitenen, "Studies  in Saa.mkhya, III,"
            pp.100-102,106.
              58. Johnston, Early, p.83, For a brief history  of
            the  development  of the jiiva  aatman  concept, see
            Kent, Valentinian...Study, pp.34-37, 53-55.  Another
            probable function of aha.mkaara  was to generate the
            bhuuta-s;  see van Buitenen, "Studies  in Saa.mkhya,
            II," p.23.
              59. Also see B ix., 64, which is a description  of
            the Saa.mkhya doctrine: "there are others who assert
            that the coming into being and the passing away from
            being is solely on account of the soul."
              60. See Kent, Valentinian...Study, pp.34-37.
              61. Or so claims Johnston, B,p.lvii.
              62. Ibid.,  p.169, n.21. Concerning  the place  of
            Kapila  and AAsuri within the Saa.mkhya  system, see
            Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya, p.149 and SK LXIX-LXX.
              63. More  precisely,  Prajaapati  symbolizes " the
            bhuutaaman, here taken as equivalent ot aha.mkaara."


                                    P.278


            Johnston, B,p.169,n.21.For  the  five  Mahaabhaarata
            references  equating Prajaapati with aha.mkaara, see
            Johnston, Early, p.17.
              64. Johnston, B,p.170,n.21. Although the emanation
            process   is  unclear,  one  wonders   whether   the
            reference to Prajaapati and his sons should be taken
            as an indication that the five elements generate out
            of aha.mkaara.  Johnston, "Some," p.864 claims  that
            this was the common emanation  pattern  found in the
            Mahaabhaarata, as mentioned above in n.23.
              65. Johnston, B,p.lxi. See also YS iii.26, and the
            accompanying Comments and Explanations.
              66. Johnston, "Some," p.869.
              67. Ibid. Johnston  even  claims  that  "spiritual
            functions" can also evolve from them.  I do not know
            what  he means  by this, since, as I see it, all  of
            the secondary  tattva-s are material  in nature.  In
            some way, however, Johnston's  claim  may be related
            to the Yoga practice of meditation  on the elements.
            See  Mircea  Eliade, Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom,
            trans.  Willard R.  Trask, Bollingen  Series 76 (Now
            York: Pantheon  Books, 1964), p.195;  and Johnston's
            reference  to "yogic absorption  in the elements" in
            "Some," p.869.
              68. Johnston claims this in "Some," p.870,although
            admitting  that the evidence is scany to support it.
            While never explaining  fully  the process  by which
            the eightfold  prak.rti, through  svabhaava, creates
            the secondary  evolutes, he does offer a few remarks
            concerning  how secondary matter was thought to have
            related to the elements: " Originally each member of
            the   ['sabda]   group   was   considered   a  gu.na
            [attribute]  of one of the elements  only...but  the
            later theory...gives  one element  the qualities  of
            all five, the next  four, and  so on to the last  of
            one only." Ibid.,pp.
            867-868.
              69. Johnston, "Some," p.870.
              70. Ibid.,p.867. The relationship between the five
            elements, the objects  of the senses  and the senses
            is very unclear.
              71. See, for instance, Karl H.Potter, ed.,Encyclo-
            pedia of Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and
            Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaaya-Vai'se.sika up
            to Ga.nge'sa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), pp.
            86-87;  112-119; 161-162; Erich Frauwallner, History
            of Indian Philosophy, trans.  V.M.  Bedekar 2 vols.,
            (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), 2:14.
              73. I borrow this basic argument from  Frauwallner
            I, pp.272-274; see also Johnston, "Some," p.871.
              74. On  the intermediary stage  between  Araa.da's
            system  and  the  Saa.mkhyakaarikaa,  in  which  the
            eightfold  and sixteen-fold  dividision  falls  into
            disfavor in the Mahaabhaarata, see Johnston, "Some,"
            pp. 870-871.
              75. Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya p. 205; see Dasgu-
            pta, p.251.
              76. See Edgerton, Beginnings, p.41, and n.2.
              77. Sen Gupta, p.121; Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya,
            p.122.
              78. Johnston, Early, pp. 54-55, based upon Mahaab-
            haarata  passages;  accepted  by  Larson,  Classical
            Saa.mkhya,  p.123.  This  is  confused, though, when
            Johnston (B,p.lx) says that A'svagho.sa  regards the
            soul "as an individual, not a universal." On the one
            hand, he fails to specify  whether  he is addressing
            A'svagho.sa's  notion of aatman  or k.setraj~na.  On
            the other hand, he fails to clarify what he means by
            "  universal"   (especially   in  relation   to  the
            Mahaabhaarata notions of aatman as "cosmic" soul).
              79. See Edgerton, "Meaning," pp.22-29.
              80. Sen Gupta, p.122.
              81. SK LXII: "Nothing, therefore, is bound,nothing
            released,  likewise   not  anything   transmigraces.
            (Only) prak.rti  in its various forms transmigrates,
            is bound, and is released."
              82. For  a general discussion  of the Buddhist at-
            tempt  to explain  " how bondage  came about and how
            freedom  is to be gained. " see Potter,  Presupposi-
            tions,  pp.113, 131.  In  their  causal  scheme  the
            Buddhists  avoid postulating  attempt to prevent the
            problem of subtle but lingering karm-ic seeds.
              83. For a critique concerning the setting forth of
            Truth or "Knowledge"  within the classical Saa.mkhya
            scheme,  see  Potter,  Presuppositions,  pp.216-217.
            Although  it  pertains  to  the  classical   school,
            Potter's discussion is relevant here.

              84. Commenting on B  xii.79 (p.180), Johnston say,
            "the argument  apparently  is that the fact that the
            k.setraj~na  is  called  'sariirin  [having  a body]
            shows that it did not exist before  there was a body
            for it to inhabit  (the bond therefore  being anaadi
            [having no beginning, existing from eternity]).


     

     【关闭窗口
    相关文章:
  • 佛教基本教义(七):八正道[38]

  • 佛教解经学文体源流略考[46]

  • 佛教基本教义(六):五蕴[79]

  • 佛教基本教义(五):四谛[92]

  • 佛教基本教义(四):四土[161]

  • 佛教基本教义(三):三明六通[186]

  • 农历七月十五,佛教中的佛欢喜日,殊胜而吉祥[197]

  • 佛教基本教义(二):三法印与三无漏学[182]

  • 佛教基本教义(一):三宝[150]

  • 明明是“鬼节”,为什么成了佛教中的欢喜日?[219]

  • 一花一世界,一叶一菩提,佛教里常见的植物有哪些?[311]

  • 佛教的历史哲学[209]

  • 为什么在佛教的众多流派中,禅宗能一枝独秀?[232]

  • 佛教中常常出现的这些动物,有何示意?[252]

  • 想认识佛教的朋友看一看!请耐心读完……[296]

  • 宇宙和生命的真正起源是什么?佛教这么看……[433]

  • 佛教日常生活中有哪些礼节?[280]

  • 佛教的第四个传统[264]

  • 佛教慈悲观与当今佛教慈善事业的践履[333]

  • 佛教与中华文明的相遇[308]

  •  
    设为首页 | 加入收藏 | 联系站长 | 友情链接 | 版权申明 | 管理登录 | 
    版权所有 Copyright© 2005 佛学研究        站长:wuys
    Powered by:Great Tang Hua Wei & XaWebs.com 2.0(2006)