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    The first argument for Sarvastivada
     
    [ 作者: David Bastow   来自:期刊原文   已阅:3931   时间:2007-1-9   录入:douyuebo


    ·期刊原文
    The first argument for Sarvastivada

    by David Bastow
    Asian Philosophy

    Vol. 5 No. 2 Oct.1995

    Pp.109-125

    Copyright by Asian Philosophy

     

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    .

                        THE FIRST ARGUMENT FOR SARVASTIVADA

         ABSTRACT Philosophers belonging to the Buddhist school of Sarvastivada
         believed in the real existence of past and future dharmas. This paper
         explores the implications, soteriological and philosophical, of an
         argument for this belief presented at the beginning of an early
         abhidharma text. The argument is two-fold: that past states of mind
         can be directly perceived; and that the temporal and causal context of
         these states of mind, including their karmic future and the
         possibility of an alternative saving future, can also be directly
         perceived. The paper relates the Sarvastivadins' theory of time to
         Buddhist concerns with self-knowledge and with conditional-ivy; and
         suggests that the argument is an early example of their adherence to
         the epistemological position of Direct Realism.

    From the very beginnings of Buddhism, different interpretations of the
    Buddha's message began to appear. Around the time of Asoka these
    differences began to be formalised, and gave rise to different schools.
    Sarvastivada was one of the major schools which arose about this time; as
    distinct from the Mahasanghikas, the Sthaviras and the Pudgalavadins. On
    the whole these different schools shared the material of the Sutra Pitakas;
    but the abhidharma texts they severally produced were more sectarian, more
    concerned with their different doctrinal theories.

    One of the books of the Sarvastivada Abhidharma Canon, the Vijnanakaya
    (probably composed about 200 BCE), has as its first section a chapter
    called the Maugdalyayana-skandhaka. [1] This chapter consists of various
    arguments designed to establish the Sarvastivadin belief in the real
    existence of past and future dharmas, and to refute the opinion expressed
    in its first sentence:

    The sramana Maugdalyayana says: The past and the future do not exist; the
    present and the unconditioned (asainskrta) exist.

    Many arguments are given in the chapter; but most of them are variants of
    that with which it begins. It is with this main argument of the chapter
    that the present paper will be concerned. (This argument does not appear in
    the summary of the Sarvastivadin position expounded and criticised by
    Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakosa, which of course was written about six
    hundred years later; and so it is not part of the debate, which has
    received some modem attention, between Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra. [2])

    In the paper's three sections I present the argument and give an analysis
    of its structure; I discuss the doctrinal context of the argument; and I
    consider matters related to its cogency as a philosophical proof. Two
    themes run throughout these three sections: the possibility of
    self-awareness, seeing one's own states of mind; and the philosophical
    theory of conditionality, of the causal and therefore ontological
    interdependence of dharmas, and its 'religious' expression in the doctrine
    of the Four Noble Truths.

    Section 1

    In this section I shall give a close paraphrase of the argument as it
    appears in the text; [3] and then an account of its argumentative structure
    as I see it. The argument begins with a reference to a pronouncement of the
    Buddha taken from a Sutra text--probably Anguttara Nikaya III section 69
    (i.e. A i 201-3). "There are three akusala-mulani (roots of ill, roots
    leading to bad consequences). These are lobha, greed; dvesa, anger; and
    moha, confusion." From this agreed premise the argument proceeds, first
    taking the case of lobha.

    There is no doubt then that there has been, is, will be a seeing that lobha
    is akusala (otherwise translated: a seeing of akusala--presumably meaning
    akusala-dharmas--in or through lobha). The lobha that is thus seen--is it
    past, present or future? If it is past or future, then it must be admitted
    that past or future exist. So could it be present? To allow this would
    involve admitting that there are in one pudgala two simultaneous cittas,
    states of consciousness; but this cannot be admitted. However, there must
    be seeing of either past lobha, or future lobha, or present lobha;
    otherwise it could not be that someone sees that lobha, akusalamula, is
    akusala. And in that case it would not happen that someone becomes repelled
    by lobha, detached, freed from lobha, obtains nirvana (or has obtained or
    will obtain nirvana).

    The same argument is then applied to other things that can be seen with
    respect to lobha: it can be seen that lobha is a fetter, a bondage, an
    anusaya; and further that lobha is to be rejected, to be left behind, to be
    abandoned, to be fully known (prajna).

    Later in the chapter other variants of what is essentially the same
    argument appear. They all use the same crucial move about the
    non-simultaneity of two cittas. One variant [4] refers directly to Sutra
    texts on mindfulness: [5] when someone has, for example, eye-bondage--that
    is the fetter of lustful visual perception--he truly knows that he has
    eye-bondage. Another variant, [6] again based on a Sutra text, [7] relates
    to the use of one's mind to discipline one's mind. "With teeth against
    teeth, with tongue against the palate, by thought (cetasa) he tames,
    disciplines, subdues thought (cittam)." In all the variants it is argued
    that the two states of consciousness cannot be simultaneous; so if the
    seeing, the true knowing, the taming, are happening now, at the present
    time, then what is seen, truly known, tamed, must exist at some time other
    than the present.

    To return to the first form of the argument, relating to the seeing of
    lobha; this is now taken up again in a slightly different way.

    There has been, there is, there will be a seeing that lobha produces
    suffering in a future life (or, a seeing of future-life suffering in
    lobha). Is what is thus seen of the past, the present or the future? Again
    the crucial move in the argument is a principle which rules out the
    possibility of what is seen being present. Here what is seen is to be
    understood as the future suffering; the 'non-simultaneity principle' this
    time is that it cannot be allowed that the same person at the same time
    performs an action and experiences its karmic consequences. [8] That is,
    the lobha and its karmic effects must be separated in time. But what is
    seen must exist in the past, the future or the present; otherwise it could
    not be that someone sees that lobha akusalamula produces in the future a
    painful retribution. And so on as before.

    The same argument is then said to apply to the other akusala-mulani, dvesa
    and moha; and to a long list of akusala actions and states of mind, mostly
    motives related to attachment, asravas, hindrances, etc.

    I shall now summarise the structure of this argument as I interpret it. In
    fact there are two arguments, one deriving from the possibility of seeing
    lobha, and the other deriving from the possibility of seeing various truths
    about lobha.

         [A 1] It is possible to see one's own state of mind (or in other
         variants it is possible truly to know one's own state of mind, or it
         is possible to grapple with, to subdue one's own state of mind).

         [A 2] The seen state of mind cannot be simultaneous with the seeing of
         it. [First principle of non-simultaneity.]

         [A 3] However, whatever can be seen must exist, must be real. So if
         the act of seeing is present, then the seen state of mind must be real
         in some non-present mode.

         [B 1] It is possible to see certain truths about this state of mind,
         this lobha; to see certain things in or through the lobha.

         Namely: (i) lobha, greed, is akusala;

                (ii) greed is an anusaya, a binding proclivity or habitual
                     motive;

               (iii) greed ought to be set aside;

                (iv) greed leads to future suffering.

         [B 2] All these four clauses in different ways involve seeing the
         future. With respect to clause iv, an argument is given: the effects
         of greed cannot be simultaneous with the act of greed itself. [Second
         principle of non-simultaneity.]

         [B 3] However, what can be seen must exist, must be real. So if the
         lobha is present, these seen futures for lobha must be real in a
         non-present mode.

    The 'second principle of non-simultaneity' is part of the general theory of
    karma, and needs no special comment. But perhaps an explanation is needed
    of what I have called the 'first principle of non-simultaneity'. As far as
    I know this is not stated as a principle in the Sutras, but it seems to
    have been generally accepted by the abhidharmikas; it follows from their
    account of the structure of the mind, and it has its own plausibility. [9]

    There were many variants of the Buddhist reductive analysis of the mind,
    differing in detail; but its main principles were not controversial.
    According to dharma theory, the person is to be analysed into a complex
    series of short-lived psychophysical experience-events. This series changes
    all the time, and so has diachronic complexity; but any momentary
    cross-section will itself reveal another dimension of synchronic
    complexity. Analyses of this momentary cross-section will reveal a group of
    causally related mental states; but always at the centre of the group is
    consciousness--in the sense of awareness and intentionality
    (citta/vijnana). All mental activity involves a grasping of something other
    than itself. But this consciousness-dharma is always accompanied by a
    variety of simultaneous mental factors (cetasikas)--attention, volition,
    thought of one kind or another, moods and motives which may be good, such
    as faith, mindfulness, equanimity; or bad such as delusion, hate, conceit.
    Some of these are always present, some vary from time to time, from moment
    to moment. But consciousness is always there. The non-simultaneity
    principle then is that an analysis of a state of mind at one time, one
    moment, can contain only one consciousness element. If an analysis did
    contain two consciousnesses, each would have its associated mental factors,
    which might in fact be incompatible with each other, opposed to each other,
    as would be hate and equanimity, passion and dispassion. So
    consciousness-dharmas must succeed each other. [10]

    The argument in the Vijnanakaya applies this general principle of
    non-simultaneity of cittas to mental activity of a special kind of
    complexity; when the person is aware of his or her own mental state. This
    introspective serf-consciousness is of course of fundamental importance for
    the Buddhist path. Only by applying oneself in intense meditation to a
    detailed knowledge of the elements which are wrongly synthesised into a
    person belief can the wayward mind be controlled, wisdom and detachment
    substituted for ignorance and desire. So when one 'sees lobha', there are
    two levels of consciousness: the greed-occurrence of which one is aware is
    itself a first-level mental complex, with consciousness at its centre,
    grasping the object of desire. But then the mindful seeing of the greed is
    a second-level consciousness. If these cannot be simultaneous, the seen
    lobha must be past or future with respect to the seeing of it. Presumably
    it will typically be in the past, though the text does not say so. Since
    whatever is seen must exist, the past lobha-dharma must exist. That is,
    although it is past, there must be a sense in which it is real at the time
    of the seeing.

    Section 2

    In this section I wish to explore two themes which are implicit in the
    Vijnanakaya arguments about time. They are (a) self-awareness in time; and
    (b) the idea that conditioned dharmas necessarily exist in a context of
    causal and therefore temporal relationships. Themes (a) and (b) are
    prominent respectively in arguments [A] and [B] as described in section 1.

    A question which naturally occurs to the Western student of Sarvastivada
    is: why should a Buddhist school think it important to work out a position
    on the metaphysics of time? As far as I know this question is not directly
    addressed by any Sarvastivadin text, so perhaps even to ask it involves
    some misunderstanding. What can be shown is that an understanding of the
    interrelations between past, present and future is crucial for the
    (ultimately reductive) self-awareness and self-understanding of the
    Buddhist person; and also for this person's awareness of his soteriological
    predicament. The Sarvastivadina were sufficiently impressed by the
    importance of these interrelations to make the further ontological move:
    that the reality of the present implies the reality of the context with
    which it is intertwined. The ancient doctrine of impermanence (later
    interpreted as momentariness) does not by itself constitute an adequate
    theory of time for the Buddhist; it must be developed to take account of
    the doctrine of conditionality.

    (a) Self-awareness in time

    The first move in the Vijnanakaya argument is the postulation of
    'seeing'--which must mean some kind of direct knowledge (the perceptual
    metaphor will be discussed in my final section)--of a state of mind. The
    use of the non-simultaneity principle in the text makes it obvious that the
    two states of consciousness, the seeing and what is seen, belong to the
    same pudgala. So we have an example of what may be called self-awareness;
    though of course in Buddhist thought reference to the self is no more than
    a facon de parler. Self-awareness plays many different roles in Buddhist
    theory. To understand the present example we need to place it in its
     context, and to distinguish it from other types and levels of
    serf-awareness important in Buddhist thought.

    At the fundamental level is the self-awareness which is necessary for
    self-construction. Our belief in our own existence as persons, as abiding
    selves, rests ultimately on the grasping by one consciousness-dharma of a
    series, a history, of other consciousness-dharmas. The basic Buddhist
    vision, explicated in terms of dharma-theory, is reductive; instead of an
    abiding self, to which from time to time various experiences are appended,
    there is a stream of short-lived dharmas, psychophysical experiential
    elements, with no abiding substantial core.

    But a full account of what constitutes the ordinary person must obviously
    include something that binds the elements together; what makes us people is
    our awareness of ourselves as people. So there must be synthetic activity;
    self-construction (one of the several meanings of samskara). The agent, the
    subject of this constructive activity, must itself lie within the stream of
    dharmas--for the stream of dharmas is all that there is. Out of the dharmas
    a self is constructed, by 'running through and holding together' (to use
    Kant's potent phrase) past experiences, and perhaps also images of possible
    futures. That is, a present dharma--a consciousness dharma--has available
    to it, in one way or another, a temporally ordered series of experiences.
    Out of them it constructs a self, by claiming them as its own. [11] Thus I
    have available to me certain experiences, as from the inside, of being a
    child, a young man, etc.; my self-awareness, my belief in myself as David
    Bastow, involves my adopting these experiences, thinking of them as part of
    my own life, regarding my present awareness of them as my memories.

    But persons are not just contemplators of the past, of what they count as
    their own past; they are agents in the world. Deliberate action on my part
    involves my looking into the future, seeing various possible futures,
    acting with the intention that one of them will come about. This activity
    of self-projection into the future is analysed in the ancient Buddhist
    causal cycle (Pali paticca-samuppada, Sanskrit pratitya-samutpada) which
    explains the causality of the round of rebirth, the perpetuation of the
    self or rather of self-construction, the continued fabrication of an
    artificial and insubstantial self. The fundamental motivating agent in this
    round of self-fabrication is desire, thirst, greed, grasping after the
    future. So the first level of self-awareness is that basic awareness of the
    past and future which contributes to self-construction. The pudgala thus
    constructed is an interweaving of the present with the past and the future;
    a being which exists purely in the present moment cannot be said to be a
    person. [12]

    The Buddha's attitude to such self-construction by awareness of dharmas
    across time is complex. Ultimately the constructed self is to be seen for
    what it is; the misguided synthesis is to be brought to an end. So as
    Dhammapada 348 says: "Let go the past. Let go the future. Let go the
    present ..." [13] But an initial stage on the path of self-deconstruction
    may be described as taking oneself seriously. Here a higher level of
    self-awareness comes into play.

    We may use a distinction from an entirely different perspective to explain
    this. The Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, in his first book
    Either/Or, [14] distinguishes initially between two ways of life; what he
    calls the aesthetic and the ethical. The aesthetic person lives a life
    ruled by feeling, by immediate impulse. [15] So he lives from day to day,
    takes no thought for the morrow, never considers the meaning of his life,
    the overall pattern of his past and future actions. His actions arise in
    the moment, . from his immediate desires and needs. But Kierkegaard gives
    us reasons for rejecting this style of life. He says that the aesthetic
    person never really becomes a self, a person, an individual; he never makes
    any real choices, so cannot be said to be really free. By contrast, the key
    idea of the ethical life is choosing oneself, taking responsibility for
    one's past; and making commitments, actively projecting oneself into the
    future. In general to set out on the ethical life is to think of oneself as
    'having a life', which embraces past, present and future, and is to be
    given a shape, a purpose, a meaning. This involves a heightened form of
    self-awareness, more explicit than that involved in basic
    self-construction. We may call this 'taking oneself seriously' the second
    level of self-awareness.

    There is no doubt that the Buddha's initial advice to those who wished to
    follow him was to choose themselves, to take responsibility for themselves,
    to realise their autonomy. He explicitly rejected the autonomy-denying
    fatalisms and nihilisms of his day [16]. Partly this was a matter of taking
    one's actions and one's motivations seriously because of their long-term
    karmic consequences; but his primary message was of the possibility of
    realising true freedom by a transcendence of the karmic cycle of action and
    consequence.

    How is this to be done? The peculiarly Buddhist answer to this question
    crucially involves a further kind, a third level, of self-awareness; and
    this is what is involved in the Vijnanakaya argument. This is a mindful
    awareness of one's own mental states, which in general is aimed at
    self-deconstruction, but in particular is aimed at changing one's mental
    make-up so as to be free of greed, hatred, confusion, the three roots of
    ill. This awareness must be analytical and objective.

    As the Vijnanakaya text says, it is seeing lobha for what it is that leads
    to rejection of it, to detachment and liberation from it. Though the greed
    itself is akusala, a cause of bad consequences, the seeing of it is
    typically kusala, leading towards freedom. The seeing, as opposed to the
    seen, is dispassionate, realistic, unfettered; or rather it is potentially
    such. To be aware of one's greed is for the moment to transcend the greed;
    the awareness is not itself greedy. But of course to be aware of greed is
    not in itself to be free of the fetter of greed. Action, the path of
    self-mastery and wisdom, is necessary to bring this freedom to fulfilment.
    text) of reactions to the seeing of lobha, that is rejection, detachment,
    etc., can be interpreted in two ways: as a project of self-change in time,
    and as a project aimed at the transcendence of time. The first undertaking
    is that of Kierkegaard's ethical person, who becomes a fully realised
    person only as he is committed to a day-to-day working out of
    life-projects, enterprises which give life a meaning. Kierkegaard's
    examples are marriage and a career which is a vocation. Similarly the
    Buddhist path could be thought of as a life-project with the aim of
    serf-fulfilment. In that case, awareness of one's own greed is knowledge
    which is valuable for its pragmatic usefulness in the path-project, like a
    racing driver becoming aware of a fault in the engine of his car. The
    seeing of greed is a step towards the freedom to act without greed; this is
    an example of what Sartre calls consciousness's ability to nihilate,
    surpass, transcend, move beyond what it is conscious of.

    But the notions of path, goal, self-realisation are paradoxical in the
    context of the Buddhist rejection of ideals of selfhood. So we need to bear
    in mind another way of interpreting the seeing of lobha and the project of
    liberation which should arise from it. This is that, while the first order
    act of greed is in time, in the moment, the seeing of it is already a
    transcendence of the moment, and indeed of the constraints of the temporal
    order. It is a distancing from the serf pursuing its projects in time, a
    partial realisation of freedom from action, from conditionality, from time
    itself; a preliminary glimpse of an end of projects. [17]

    (b) Causal and temporal relationships

    Argument [B] goes beyond self-awareness, the seeing of a state of mind. It
    is concerned with the placing of the state of mind, for example lobha, in a
    context--primarily the context of its possible futures. Lobha has these
    futures in that it is tied to them by various types of causality. So what
    is seen is not a future detached from the present, as would be a future
    event seen in a crystal ball, but rather a causal web by which dharmas of
    the three times are linked together.

    In this subsection I wish to suggest that a motive for the Sarvastivadins'
    concern with the ontological status of past and future dharmas was their
    vivid appreciation of the importance of this causal web. Not that causality
    was a new concern within Buddhism; the doctrine of paticca-samuppada was
    always central in the Buddhist understanding of the world of samsara, and
    paticca-samuppada itself was to be understood in the context of the Four
    Noble Truths. That is, as the Second of the Truths it places present
    suffering in the context of the past karmic activity which has brought it
    about, and present desire in the context of the future suffering which will
    follow from it. But also the Third and Fourth Noble Truths tell of a
    different causality leading to freedom from ignorance, from desire and
    therefore from suffering.

    Why then should an appreciation of the Four Noble Truths and their
    ontological implications be particularly associated with the
    Sarvastivadins? In brief, because they made 'vision' of the Truths central
    to their account of the Path. The Vijnanakaya text is an early
    manifestation of Sarvastivadin doctrinal developments not merely in that it
    argues to the real existence of past and future dharmas ('sarvasti'), but
    also in that the details of the arguments reveal the background concerns
    which made this 'real existence' important for the school.

    These doctrinal developments have been surveyed and analysed by Erich
    Frauwallner, [18] and especially in a recent comprehensive analysis by
    Collett Cox. [19] The developments were concerned mainly with the Buddhist
    path; with its aim and with its method. The Sarvastivadins gradually
    produced a newly focused and systemafised account of the path, as the
    abandonment, the setting aside of 'anusayas'. This term occurs relatively
    rarely in the Sutras (though the sutra term 'asrava' is an enigmatic
    equivalent); but it does occur in our Vijnanakaya text, associated with the
    notions of lettering and bondage. The term means something like a long-term
    habit of mind and of motivation, deep-seated and recalcitrant to change.
    There are various more or less elaborate lists of these mental fetters. The
    lists always contain the three akusala-mulani, greed or desire, hatred, and
    ignorance or confusion, but as the tradition develops there comes to be
    more and more emphasis on the cognitive element, the conquest of ignorance,
    doubt, confusion. These constraining habits of mind are on the
    Sarvastivadin account seen as the root cause of suffering; their removal is
    the key to liberation.

    How are they to be removed? The answer is a consolidation and
    systematisation of the culmination of the path as described in the
    Samannaphalasutta:

         . . . he applies and bends his mind to the knowledge pertaining to the
         extinction of all asavas. He knows as it really is [the Four Noble
         Truths as related to suffering]. He knows as they really are 'these
         are asavas; this is the origin of asavas; this is the extinction of
         asavas; this is the path leading to the extinction of asavas'. To him
         thus realising, thus seeing, his mind is set free from the asavas of
         sensuous desire, of existence, of ignorance. [20]

    In the Sarvastivadin texts, the primary method for the abandonment of the
    anusayas is vision (darsana) of the Four Noble Truths. On many accounts,
    vision has to be supplemented by cultivation (bhavana); but as Cox makes
    clear these two paths were complementary, and basically similar in mode of
    operation. With respect to each anusaya the application to it of the Four
    Noble Truths must first be understood, and then experientially realised.
    Cox summarises the path-structure as follows:

         Praxis consists of a gradual process through which one is sequentially
         disconnected from specific defilements through the application of
         vision and cultivation, culminating in the complete abandonment and
         future non-arising of all such defilements. [21]

    It seems to me that we have in this refocused understanding of the path two
    linked motives for the Sarvastivadin concern for the reality of past and
    future. First, the notion of an anusaya, a long-term habit of mind, itself
    emphasises the temporal interconnections which constitute a person. This is
    a powerful causality which has to be broken down, a new interpretation
    perhaps of pratitya-samutpada; to break it down one has to understand it
    and grasp its whole temporal extension into past and future.

    Second, and more importantly, the renewed and systematic emphasis on the
    Four Noble Truths is itself an emphasis on the importance of appreciating
    the reality of past and future. As explained earlier, the Truths operate
    precisely by placing suffering in its causal and temporal context. So the
    reality of this context--the causal web in which our present existence is
    situated--needs to be metaphysically safeguarded; and it also needs to be
    epistemologically justified. These are precisely the concerns of the
    Vijnanakaya arguments.

    The four characterisations of lobha in the Vijnanakaya argument [B] restate
    and redescribe this causal and temporal web. These characterisations are
    that lobha is:

         (i) akusala
         (ii) a fetter, an anusaya
         (iii) to be abandoned
         (iv) a cause of future suffering.

    The first summarises the other three, so need not be commented on
    separately. Clause iv refers to a structurally simple type of causality,
    the simple karmic link between action (in this case the mental act of
    greed) and experience (in this case suffering). The 'seeing' here is a
    straightforward confirmation of the second of the Noble Truths. The
    causality is one-directional and not in itself serf-perpetuating. Action
    leads karmically to experience; but experience, being resultant and
    therefore not karmically potent, does not necessarily lead to renewed
    action.

    Clause ii refers to a more complex kind of psychological causality. The
    text says that as it can be seen that lobha is akusala, so it can be seen
    that lobha is samyojana, bandhana, anusaya, upaklesa, paryavasthana. [22]
    Cox says that this is "a stylised list used frequently to refer to all
    varieties of defiling factors" p. 69.

    Of the five terms anusaya came to be taken as the generic term for these
    akusala habits of mind. The metaphor of bondage is obvious in the first two
    elements of the list, samyojana and bandhana. The point is that an
    occurrence of lobha is inadequately understood unless it is seen as one
    phase and manifestation of a self-perpetuating system, reaching into the
    past and the future. These mental characteristics are long-term,
    persistent, difficult to get out of. They are felt by those striving for
    freedom as a constraint, and are recalcitrant to their efforts towards
    freedom. They are not to be removed by a simple act of will. To see, as in
    the Vijnanakaya argument, that greed is a fetter, is to see the future, in
    that the present instance of greed will unless drastic action is taken be
    followed whether one likes it or not by future greedy acts, all karmically
    potent. The complex psychological implications of the metaphor of bondage
    are very well articulated by Vasubandhu at the beginning of his lengthy
    chapter on anusayas in the Abhidharmakosa (v la). The picture is one of
    positive feedback--an occurrence of greed itself results in a series of
    such occurrences; it leads to a strength-erring of the bond, tying the
    defilement more securely to the person; it leads to ignorance and error
    about the true nature of the object of the desire; and it strengthens its
    own cause, namely ayoniso-manaskara, misdirected thought or attention.

    Clause iii in the Vijnanakaya text describes quite a different future which
    may be seen in lobha. Lobha is to be set aside, discarded, fully and
    ultimately known. This makes it clear that the positive feedback of the
    anusayas is not inevitable; though it is typical, and for ordinary people
    almost universal. The reflective person though sees in lobha not only its
    typical akusala future, but also its proper future, that future which is in
    accordance with true values. To see lobha as it is to see not only that it
    leads to suffering, but also that it should be rejected, discarded.

    So the Sarvastivadins' belief in the reality of past and future does not
    commit them to an absolutely fixed future, to a deterministic universe. A
    true vision and comprehension of the present dharmas sees them as nodes
    with at least two types of future latent within them. (As was made explicit
    in later texts, future dharmas exist which as a matter of fact never become
    present.)

    According to the developed Sarvastivadin doctrine of the Path, what makes
    the difference between these two futures is the persistence or abandonment
    of anusayas, mental dispositions to false and confused world views and to
    the passions which manifest and nurture these world views. Abandonment is
    achieved by a vision of the Four Noble Truths, that is of the complex
    causal context of the dispositions. The Vijnanakaya argument [B] is
    concerned precisely with the vision of the causal and temporal context of
    lobha as one of these dispositions.

    Section 3

    Finally I wish to consider the arguments in the Vijnanakaya as
    philosophical arguments. My aim here is not to make a final judgement on
    their validity, but rather to indicate the more general philosophical
    issues which are raised by them. It seems to me that large areas of
    philosophical debate are opened up by all the central aspects of these
    arguments.

    As I said in my first section, there are really two distinct arguments: the
    argument [A] from the seeing of lobha, which is presumably meant to show
    the reality of a limited set of past dharmas; and the argument [B] from the
    seeing of the temporal and causal context of the lobha dharma. It is worth
    remarking how limited these claims are. The matter at issue is not, at
    least as far as these arguments are concerned, the reality of all dharmas
    in the past and future history of the universe. The Buddhist theoretician
    is concerned only with making sense of soteriological understanding and
    practice; the Sarvastivadins were working out a metaphysics of time which
    they thought would underpin that soteriology.

    The two arguments [A] and [B] have a similar form. Both begin (1) with an
    'empirical' claim, that a certain kind of dharma can be seen. Both then
    argue (2) that these seen dharmas cannot be present at the time of the
    seeing; they must be past or future dharmas. And both conclude by invoking
    the principle (3) that whatever can be seen must be real, must exist, at
    the time of the perception. So past and future dharmas must be real.

    [A 1] States of mind such as greed may be 'seen'. As I have argued in
    section 2(a) above, this is a reference to the analytical 'self'-awareness
    involved in the Buddhist meditative technique of mindfulness. As such it is
    for the Buddhist non-controversial; and insofar as it makes an empirical
    claim about what is possible for the Buddhist practitioner I have 'no
    comment to make on it.

    [A 2] What is seen (when greed, etc. is seen) cannot be simultaneous with
    the seeing of it. I have explained (in section 1) the context of this in
    abhidharmic psychological analysis; but there is also a context of
    philosophical debate, which should be mentioned here. In Kathavatthu V.9
    (this is a Theravadin (Sthaviravadin) abhidhamma text from about the same
    time as the Vijnanakaya) there is a brief debate in which the following
    questions are asked:

         Is there knowledge of the present?
         Is there knowledge of that knowledge by that same knowledge?
         Is there knowledge that the knowledge is knowledge by that same
            knowledge?
         Is the knowledge the object (arammana) of that same knowledge?[23]

    The only arguments given in answer to these questions seem to support the
    denial of the identification of the first- and second-order knowledges.
    They present analogies, at first ambivalent--'Does one feel a feeling by
    that same feeling?'; but finally more decisive:

         Does one cut a sword with that same sword?
         Does one touch a finger-tip with that same finger-tip?

    The Commentary links the debate clearly with the Vijnanakaya argument:
    'Because two knowledges cannot be simultaneous in one self-conscious
    subject, knowledge of the present cannot be known by the same act of
    knowledge.' Mrs Rhys Davids' comment (on the Commentary) is pertinent: 'In
    other words, self-consciousness is really an act of retrospection; its
    object is not present but past'. [24] But the Kathavatthu passage can also
    be seen as prefiguring a much later debate, described in chapter 5 of Bimal
    K. Matilal's Perception. [25] This is about whether an awareness-event
    (vijnana) is self-revealing, so that to be aware of something is by virtue
    of the activity of that same dharma to be aware that one is aware; or
    whether a second-order awareness-event is necessary for such
    self-consciousness. As Matilal describes the debate (pp. 148-149), the
    Nyaya position is that for serf-awareness two knowledges are necessary;
    Dinnaga though believes that mental events are by their nature
    serf-luminous, sva-samvedana. As in other matters, the position taken in
    the Vijnanakaya seems to be closer to Nyaya than to Dinnaga.

    But in my view the matter is more complex than 'one vijnana or two
    vijnanas'; self-awareness, knowledge of knowledge, is not a unitary
    concept. The distinctions described in my section 2 (a) are relevant here.
    Whether or not there is a sense in which conscious states are
    self-luminous, what I described earlier as the three levels of
    serf-awareness cannot be identified with their object, for the object
    consciousness may well exist in their absence. A mental dharma can well
    exist without being made part of a synthesised person-construct; without
    being part of a meaningful 'life'; and without being the object of mindful
    introspective analysis. In the seeing of lobha there are two distinct
    states of consciousness, playing the distinct roles of object and subject
    of perception.

    As for the pastness of the perceived lobha, this is guaranteed by the
    'first principle of non-simultaneity'. But even without this principle it
    can plausibly be argued that some memory-knowledge of our own states of
    mind has at least the appearance of direct perception; for example my vivid
    present recollection of my greedy desire for the last piece of cake at the
    party I attended yesterday evening.

    Two philosophical comments on the self-awareness theme remain to be made.
    The first is about the possibility of introspection. For reasons which will
    become apparent my discussion of this will follow my remarks about [B 1].
    The second relates to the interpretation of 'seeing' as direct immediate
    cognition; and the argument (3) that what is directly cognised must exist.
    Comment on this will form the final part of this Section.

    [B 1] To see a dharma as it is involves seeing at least something of its
    past and its possible futures.

    The 'empirical' 'claim here is that it is possible in seeing lobha to see
    its karmic consequences in future-life suffering; and also its alternative
    possible future leading towards liberation and its long-term status as an
    anusaya, a fetter. Obviously there is need of some metaphysical theory to
    explain the possibility of the seeing of dharmas from the three times. The
    Sarvastivadins later developed a sophisticated theory of 'karitra',
    according to which past, present and future modes of reality are
    distinguished by their functions, their causal powers. But what is needed
    for the Vijnanakaya argument is a theoretical account of the relation
    between lobha and its past and futures which makes possible the seeing of
    them through it. Just such a theory is to be found in the Maha-vibhasa.
    [26] It lies behind the arguments in that text for the reality of past and
    future dharmas. The theory rests firmly on the concept of conditionality
    which pervades the early texts.

    The dharmas we are considering here are conditioned, samskrta; that is,
    they are by their nature interrelated with the complex set of dharmas
    involved in their causation, and are themselves part of the causal
    conditions for future dharmas. The claim is that to see them for what they
    are is necessarily to see them within this system of interrelationships,
    linking past, present and future dharmas. What they are includes their
    interrelations with other dharmas, past and future; their reality implies
    the reality of the whole causal web of which they are merely one node. This
    relational ontology is implicit in the Sutta expositions of
    paticca-samuppada, where the theory of conditionality is a middle way
    between existence and non-existence, between eternalism and annihilationism
    (Samyutta Nikaya, Sutta 12 (Midanasamyutta), for example section 15,
    section 17; S ii 15-19). There certainly are links between past, present
    and future, but they are not substantial (as in eternalism), and they are
    not merely external (as in annihilationism). The remaining possibility is
    that the momentary dharmas are in their very nature internally related to
    the past which conditions them and the future (or futures) which they
    condition. The idea is abstractly expressed in one version of the
    Maha-vibhasa argument: the present could not be the present except in the
    context of past and future.

    So if past, present and future dharmas are (though in a sense momentary)
    internally related to each other, then it makes sense to claim that someone
    who sees a present dharma as it is will see its context of conditioning and
    conditioned dharmas; for they are a part of what it is. So to see in the
    fullest sense a present lobha-dharma (actually by argument [A] not present
    but past), is to see not the past and future phases of this particular
    dharma but other past and future dharmas which are internally related to
    it.

    The position has clear analogies with the Sankhya theory of satkaryavada,
    that the effect is present in the cause. In fact in Abhidharma-kosa v 26
    Vasubandhu criticises one version of the Sarvastivada theory of time as
    being indistinguishable from the Sankhya theory of parinama. But there are
    also clear distinctions, as Braj Sinha argues in chapter 8 of Time and
    Temporality in Samkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism. [27] The Sankhya view
    depends on a strong theory of substance; of abiding elements which are
    merely rearranged in the process of change and evolution. The Sarvastivadin
    theory operates without substantial continuity; the relations between
    present and past and future, between cause and effect, are real but merely
    causal.

    I now turn back briefly to the 'self-awareness' theme prominent in argument
    [A]. Is lobha, greed, the kind of thing that can be inwardly seen,
    introspected? Modern philosophical psychologists have cast doubt on the
    appropriateness of a perceptual model for what seems to be direct knowledge
    of our own states of mind, such as my knowledge of my own greedy desires.
    For example, Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind:

         Motives and moods are not the sorts of things which could be among the
         direct intimations of consciousness, or among the objects of
         introspection, as these factitious forms of 'Privileged Access' are
         ordinarily described. They are not experiences, any more than habits
         or maladies are experiences. [28]

    Here Ryle moves from his own analysis of such statements as 'I greedily
    desired that piece of cake' to a rejection of the possibility of this
    greedy desire being an object of introspection, in the sense of direct
    perceptual (though non-sensory) knowledge of the state of mind. For Ryle,
    terms such as desire and greed serve as action explanations not because
    they name a mental episode which precedes and precipitates the action; but
    rather because they indicate the general context in which the action was
    done. For example, 'the action was motivated by greed' would be analysed as
    equivalent to something like 'the action was aimed at short term
    self-gratification without much thought for its effects on other people.'

    So knowledge that an action was done from greed would rest on an
    understanding of this context. This would involve knowledge of mental
    episodes, but none of these episodes would in itself constitute greed.
    Similarly for motives of hatred and confusion; these cannot be
    introspected, for one cannot introspect a context or a propensity.

    What would be the Sarvastivadin response to such a counter-theory? My view,
    perhaps surprisingly, is that the Sarvastivadin would find some aspects of
    the modern theory congenial. This follows from principle [B 1]. As I argued
    above, this implies that present reality can be understood only in the
    context of past and future reality--in fact the very idea of the present
    implies the existence of a past and a future. The 'realism' of
    Sarvastivadin dharma-theory does not imply the existence of dharmas as
    self-contained isolated quanta of existence; in fact this is the very
    opposite of the truth.

    So the Rylean and the Sarvastivadin positions meet in the assertion that
    the under- standing of greed, etc. involves not just presently occurrent
    phenomenological states, but a whole context of past and future thoughts
    and actions. Both would agree for example that greed is only greed if it
    rests on an acquisitive belief in the self, and leads to a certain type of
    morally deficient action.

    There is though a fundamental difference between the two accounts. For Ryle
    the links between a greedy state of mind and the consequential actions
    would be logical; without a particular pattern of thought and action it
    would not count as greed. That is just what greed means.

    In the Vijnanakaya argument also, the links between past, present and
    future phenomena are necessary, but here the necessity is real rather than
    merely nominal. So also the epistemology is different, being not a matter
    of linguistic analysis but of direct knowledge of the structure of
    consciousness, as in the true dispassionate phenomenological epoche in
    which the essential structure of a state of consciousness is known.

    So for Ryle mental states cannot be introspected, directly intuited,
    because they logically involve a past and future context. The
    Sarvastivadins agree that mental states do involve a past and future
    context; but to see these states as they really are is, as in the
    Vijnanakaya argument, precisely to intuit this complex causal and temporal
    context.

    [A 3, B 3] My final discussion is of the epistemological principle (3)
    which is crucial to both arguments, [A] and [B]. Put at its simplest, this
    is the principle that 'if x can be seen, then x exists'. This seems
    innocuous, almost tautological, but is here put to powerful use. In fact
    the Vijnanakaya argument uses an extension of the principle, for the
    knowledge of lobha is not literally by sight; mental rather than visual
    consciousness is involved. But the analogy with visual cognition is
    important; it is no doubt meant to imply that this 'knowledge by the mind'
    is in some way direct (knowledge by acquaintance) rather than by
    description. This is certainly a plausible account of mindfulness, and of
    short term memory images.

    But the application of the principle to past and future dharmas implies a
    more specific meaning for 'direct knowledge'. That is, it must be assumed
    that in this 'seeing' the perceptual consciousness grasps the very object
    (the lobha-dharma) itself, not an intermediary representation. For only on
    this interpretation is the argument at all plausible. If what is presently
    grasped (in argument [A]) is not the past greedy desire itself but some
    representation of it, perhaps causally derived from a memory trace, there
    is no reason to conclude that the past desire is now real. Similarly
    argument [B] has little force if what is now grasped is an imagined
    representation of a predictable future. So what the argument implies is
    that the cognitive consciousness grasps not representations of the past and
    future dharmas (however fight might be the causal story linking
    representations and dharmas), but these very dharmas themselves.

    The plausibility of the argument as a whole depends therefore on the
    possibility of theoretical support for this account of the relation between
    the perceiving consciousness and its object. Such support may be found in
    the epistemological theory known as Direct (or Naive) Realism. In modern
    epistemology little attention has been paid to this theory, for it has been
    thought to collapse rapidly into Representative Realism. For surely direct
    perception implies true and complete perception, whereas it is easy to show
    that perceptual knowledge is often partial, subjective, misleading. So what
    is immediately perceived must be an internal object, at a remove from the
    external reality which it aims to represent. If general perception involves
    an internal representation, then it would seem that this could easily be
    invoked as above, to defeat the Vijnanakaya argument of the reality of past
    and future dharmas.

    Indeed the Vijnanakaya arguments rely on an unusually extreme version of
    Direct Realism. One could be a Direct Realist with respect to the
    perception of present trees and chairs, but invoke mediating
    representations to explain our knowledge of past and future experiences. On
    the other hand, the Vijnanakaya's Direct Realism with respect to past and
    future would seem a fortiori to imply Direct Realism with respect to the
    present.

    It follows that a full defence of our argument would require a strong
    defence of Direct Realism as an epistemological theory, with an attack on
    the notion of representations as internal objects; or at least a
    demonstration that the postulation of such internal objects is unnecessary.

    The present paper is not the place for such a defence. I wish instead to
    comment briefly on the historical context. There are good reasons for
    thinking that Direct Realism was in Indian philosophical debate seen as a
    viable and sophisticated theory; and that the Sarvastivadins themselves did
    in their epistemological arguments see things from a Direct Realist point
    of view.

    The wider context of Indian philosophical epistemology is admirably
    presented in Bimal K Matilal's Perception. [28] This book is largely
    concerned with the debate in classical Indian philosophy between adherents
    of Direct and Representative Realism (and also the theories of
    Phenomenalism and Idealism, which standardly develop out of the two
    Realisms). It is one of the many fascinations of the book for the student
    of Sarvastivada that Matilal shows how Direct Realism, which has a strong
    initial plausibility, can be developed in a far from naive way; and was so
    developed by Nyaya and Mimamsa. Matilal's main theme is the contrast
    between Nyaya realism and Buddhist phenomenalism; for him the main stream
    of Buddhist epistemology is represented by Dinnaga and Dharmakirti, and he
    does not link his extended discussions of Direct Realism to the
    Sarvastivada tradition. [29] For Matilal Direct Realism naturally goes with
    a belief in the real existence of external objects, trees and horses;
    whereas the Buddhist ontology ultimately reduces these to briefly
    manifested dharmas. Still, the Direct Realist view can survive in these
    changed surroundings, emphasising the distinction between perceiving
    dharmas and perceived dharmas, and insisting that no perceptual event can
    take place unless there is an object, a collection of object dharmas, to be
    apprehended. [30]

    This Direct Realist refusal to accept the possibility of perception with no
    external object is evident, for example, in a central Sarvastivadin
    (Vaibhasika) text, though one written many centuries later than the
    Vijnanakaya. This is Sanghabhadra's defence of Sarvastivada against
    Vasubandhu's attack in the Abhidharma-kosa. [31] In Vasubandhu's account of
    the debate on the Sarvastivada theory of time he presents four arguments
    supporting the Sarvastivada position. The second and third of these are
    versions of the abstract argument already noted in the Vijnanakaya: [32]
    vijnana arises only in the presence of sense organ and sense object;
    manovijnana may have as its object past and future dharmas; so these
    dharmas must exist. In his (Sautrantika) criticism of these arguments
    Vasubandhu makes the standard Representative Realist move. He allows that
    there is a sense in which past and future dharmas may be the object of
    present vijnana; obviously we can now think about and even have knowledge
    of the past and the future; but this has no implications with respect to
    external reality. 'Object' (alambana) in this sense can for Vasubandhu mean
    no more than internal representation. In the debate which follows, in the
    Abhidharma-kosa and in Sanghabhadra's response, the issue is generalised.
    Surely, says the Sautrantika, there are many cases of vijnana with a
    non-existent object (asadvisayalambaka), i.e. with an internal object,
    alambana, but with no external object, visaya. He cites for example dream
    objects, the mistaken idea of the 'self', the knowledge of someone who
    hears a sound that before the sound arose there was no sound ... In each
    case the Sarvastivadin is at pains to show that the perception is a
    grasping of some existing thing. The perceived object may not be correctly
    known; there may be confusion about its temporal status (as in dreams where
    something that is actually past is thought to be present). But the
    principle is at all costs to be preserved, that vijnana must have an
    object, and that not merely an internal object. In fact for the Direct
    Realist the external existent takes the place of the internal object.

    Conclusion

    The Vijnanakaya argument is worthy of attention not just because of the
    intrinsic philosophical interest of debates on the nature of time, but also
    because the argument draws its conclusions from two central areas of
    Buddhist concern: self-awareness and self-analysis, and conditionality.

    Many different types of self-awareness are involved in the Buddhist
    understanding of the person; the seeing of lobha which is invoked in our
    argument is a direct unmediated grasping of a mental element, part of a
    dispassionate analysis of the stream of consciousness which outside the
    Path is falsely taken to constitute a self. But the mental element thus
    Chosen to play the central role in the 'first argument' has a particular
    potency. As a form of desire it is a basic cause of the suffering cycle of
    samsara; as an anugaya it is a manifestation of a long term
    self-perpetuating character trait. So its present reality is inextricable
    from its relations with past and future dharmas. These complex causal
    relations are the burden of pratitya-samutpada and of the Four Noble
    Truths; it was in support of the reality of those causal relations, of that
    causal web, that the Sarvastivadins argued to the reality of past and
    future dharmas.

    NOTES

    [1] This chapter is in DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, LOUIS (1925) Le controverse du
    temps et du pudgala dans le Vijnanakaya, Etudes Asiatiques publiees a
    l'occasion du 25me anniversaire de l'Ecole Francaise de l'Extreme-orient
    (Paris), pp. 346-358, which is a translation of the first pan of Nanjio
    1281, Tokyo, XXIII, 9, pp. 1-72. I have with the help of Mr Victor He,
    University of Sunderland, compared de la Vallee Poussin's translation with
    Taisho 26.1539, 531a-536a. This comparison revealed only one substantial
    problem of translation, which is noted below (note 8).

    [2] This first chapter of the Vijnanakaya does contain (DE LA VALLEE
    POUSSIN, op. cit., note 1, pp. 352-353) a version of an argument about
    vijnana: that vijnana relating to past and future cannot be analambana
    vijnana; for the Buddha clearly defined vijnana as that which discerns or
    grasps its object, the visible, sound, smell, taste, the tangible, dharmas.
    This argument is reported and commented on by Vasubandhu in Abhidharma-kosa
    v 25 a-b. It may be an abstract version of the argument discussed in the
    present paper; but as it stands it is too schematic for its import to be
    clear. The 'first argument' of the Vijnanakaya makes clear, as the vijnana
    argument does not, what precisely is meant by awareness of past and future.

    [3] DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, op. cit., note 1, pp. 346-349.

    [4] Ibid., p. 350.

    [5] Samyutta Nikaya iv 89.

    [6] DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, op. cit., note 1, p. 352.

    [7] Majjhima Nikaya i 242.

    [8] At this point de la Vallee Poussin's translation is misleading. 'Ce qui
    est l'object de cette vue, est-ce l'attachement passe? est-ce l'attachement
    futur? est-ce l'attachement present?' But for the object of the seeing here
    to be lobha would make nonsense of the argument; what is seen (in or
    through the lobha) must be the suffering which derives from and is
    temporally distinct from the lobha. And the Chinese in fact asks merely:
    'Is what is seen of the past, the present or the future?'

    [9] Compare COX, COLLETT (1988) On the possibility of a non-existent object
    of consciousness: Sarvastivadin and Darstantika theories, Journal of the
    International Association of Buddhist Studies, 11 (1), footnote 52:
    'According to the Sarvastivadins and Darstantikas, two instances of thought
    (citta) or perceptual consciousness (vijnana) cannot occur simultaneously.'
    Our passage in the Vijnanakaya is the earliest text to which Collett Cox
    refers to justify her statement. See also Abhidharmakosa ii 34d: the citta
    and caittas which have the same object are simultaneous, but 'at a given
    moment only one single citta can arise'.

    [10] It is interesting that Gilbert Ryle uses as what he admits is a rather
    feeble argument against the possibility of introspective self-awareness the
    implausibility of 'attending twice at once': "... the occurrence of such an
    act of inner perception would require that the observer could attend to two
    things at the same time. He would for example be both resolving to get up
    early and concomitantly observing his act of resolving;" RYLE, GILBERT
    (1949) The Concept of Mind (London, Hutchinson) p. 164. Of course from the
    Sarvastivadin point of view this objection simply begs the question.

    [11] For a fuller analysis of this constructive synthetic activity, see
    BASTOW, DAVID (1986) Self- construction in Buddhism, Ratio, XXVIII (2), pp.
    97-113.

    [12] See BASTOW, DAVID (1995) Becoming a changed person, Philosophical
    Investigations, 18 (1), pp. 49-64.

    [13] It is significant, and in accord with Sarvastivadin thinking, that
    when the past and the future are abandoned, so is the present. As will be
    argued later in this paper, past, present and future are inextricably
    intertwined. The realisation of impermanence and no-self cannot be
    understood as a mode of living purely in the present.

    [14] KIERKEGAARD, SOREN (1959) Either/Or (New York, Anchor Books). First
    published 1843.

    [15] This is not the only type of aesthetic life described in Either or,
    but it is pertinent here, as a realisation of 'momentariness' which is
    obviously far from the Buddhist ideal.

    [16] BASTOW, DAVID (1994) Levels of self-awareness in Pali Buddhism,
    Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, XV (1), especially pp. 5-9.

    [17] This interpretation of Sarvastivada finds no direct support in my
    text, so I shall not discuss it further. But in his important book: Time
    and Temporality in Samkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism (New Delhi,
    Munshiram Manoharlal, 1983), and especially in Chapter 9, Brai M. Sinha
    discusses "the significance of reflection as a special mode of being and
    the central role that it plays in the transcendence of temporality" (p.
    143). Sinha's notion of 'reflection' points to the ability of consciousness
    to step outside its own subject-object structure; in the present case a
    radical depersonalising of lobha.

    [18] FRAUWALLNER, ERICH (1971) Abhidharma-Studien III. Der Abhisamayavadah,
    Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudund Ostasiens, 15, pp. 69-102.

    [19] COX, COLLETT (1993) Attainment through abandonment: the Sarvastivadin
    path of removing defilements, in: R. E. BUSWELL & R. M. GIMELLO (Eds) Paths
    to Liberation (Honolulu, HI, Kuroda Institute; University of Hawaii Press)
    pp. 63-105.

    [20] Digha Nikaya i 84.

    [21] COX, op. cit., note 19, p. 77. See also Abhidharma-kosa v 3, 4 and 5.

    [22] DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, op. cit., note 1, p. 347; see also COX, op.
    cit., note 19, p. 69 and footnote 27. Upaklesa and paryavasthana refer
    particularly to the occurrent manifestations of the dispositions.

    [23] Kathavatthu (Pali Text Society 1979) p. 314. See BASTOW, DAVID (1995)
    Debates about time in the Kathavatthu, Buddhist Studies Review,
    forthcoming. For reasons explained in that paper, the PTS translation
    (Points of Controversy) by S. Z. Aung & C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London, 1960)
    Luzac for the Pali Text Society is radically misleading, being an
    interpretation based more on the Commentary
    (Kathavatthuppakarana-Atthakatha, Pali Text Society 1989) than on the text
    oft he Kathavatthu.

    [24] AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, op. cit., note 23, p. 183, footnote 1.

    [25] MATILAL, BIMAL K. (1986) Perception (Oxford, Clarendon Press) chapter
    5: 'Knowing that one knows'.

    [26] The Maha-vibhasa is an immense survey of Sarvastivadin doctrine dating
    from several centuries after the Vijnanakaya (see for example HIRAKAWA, A.
    A History of Indian Buddhism, Honolulu, HI, 1990; pp. 135-136). The
    relevant arguments about time are translated by Louis DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN
    (1937) Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques V, pp. 8-25. For a full discussion
    of these arguments, see BASTOW, DAVID (1994) The Maha-vibhasa arguments for
    Sarvastivada, Philosophy East and West, 44 (3), pp. 489-499.

    [27] SINHA, op. cit., note 17, p. 125 "While for Abhidharma Buddhism
    temporal becoming exemplifies the constancy of the "continuum" (samtana),
    the Samkhya-Yoga speaks of the constancy of the continuant (samtani).'

    [28] RYLE, op. cit., note 10, p. 115.

    [29] MATILAL, op. cit., note 25. The first sentence of the Introduction is
    'Naive Realism is not really naive'.

    [30] Except in the 'Chronological Table of Philosophers' at the beginning
    of the book, where he says (p. xiii) 'Vaibhasika phenomenalistic realism
    believes that percepts are as much real as the perception itself and the
    external world is directly grasped in our conception-free perception'.

    [31] The most complete account of early philosophical developments in this
    area is the paper by Collett Cox, op. cit., note 9. Professor Cox does not
    explicitly link her description of these debates to the choice between
    Direct and Representative Realism, but there seems little doubt that this
    is what is at stake here. That is, to take the title of Cox's paper, the
    question 'Can there be a non-existent object of consciousness?' really
    means: can vijnana take as its object an internal representation, for which
    there may be no similar or simultaneous external objective grounding? For
    the Darstantika, who believes in internal representations, there is no
    problem here; for Sarvastivada there are no internal objects, so the only
    possible objects of perception are external, so in the absence of such
    external objects perception is impossible.

    [32] Vasubandhu's discussion is in Abhidharma-kosa V 25-26. Sanghabhadra's
    response in the Nydyanusara is translated in DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, op.
    cit., note 26, pp. 25-128.

    [32] See note 2 above.


     

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