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    Time and temporality--A Buddhist approach
     
    [ 作者: Kenneth K. Inada   来自:期刊原文   已阅:3387   时间:2007-1-15   录入:douyuebo


    ·期刊原文
    Time and temporality--A Buddhist approach

    Kenneth K. Inada
    Philosophy East and West 24, no. 2, APRIL 1974.
    (c) by The University Press of Hawaii
    p.171-179


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    .

     

                                    p.171

            This article  may create  more problems  rather  than
            settling the question of time and temporality. And if
            it  does, it  only  points  to the  fact  that  these
            concepts  have  not been  systematically  treated  in
            Buddhism  proper or have not been the central  issues
            around  which  schools  have  developed.  There  is a
            tendency, to be sure, to downgrade  these concepts as
            "not   conducive   to  calm,  to  higher   knowledge,
            enlightenment-nirvaa.na," or to treat them cursorily,
            in a very indirect  way, which leaves  the reader  in
            suspense or puzzlement. I hope, of course, to present
            an approach which is consistent  or coherent with the
            fundamental  structure of Buddhist doctrines.(1) Thus
            I have  come here to learn  just  as much as you have
            come to question.
                I believe  it  is  generally  safe  to  say  that
            Buddhism   falls  within  the  category  of  process,
            philosophies  since one of its cardinal principles is
            impermanence (anicca/anitya). Any and every item will
            have to be accounted for within this context. Yet, as
            we all know, explaining or describing the tenets of a
            process  philosophy  is  nearly  an impossible  task,
            leaving so much unsaid or unattended that we are left
            in a general  state  of vagueness, if not  doubt.  It
            must be noted that in process philosophy  the primary
            problem  is to perceive  the process and its elements
            in the proper  order  and relation.  Methodologically
            speaking, although  we can  distinguish  between  the
            dynamic and the static aspects, in the final analysis
            (speaking from the standpoint of concrete actuality),
            the seemingly  static elements  must be viewed within
            the dynamic nature of things. This is the predicament
            we face over and over again.
                Now, the concepts  of time  and temporality  have
            come  to us as a real  challenge  to view the dynamic
            nature  of Buddhist  reality, for they will  show  up
            that predicament very plainly and, hopefully, lead us
            the way to its resolution and to Buddhist reality.
                The whole of Buddhist  thought is permeated  with
            the notion  that life is transitory, not only  in the
            fact  that  life  terminates   in  death,  but,  more
            philosophically, that between birth and death we live
            in  momentariness.   This  is  the  theory  known  as
            kha.na-vaada/k.sa.na-vaada.   Life  is  a  series  of
            experiential  moments, each one unique but each is so
            infinitesimally  small  that  except  by a method  of
            abstraction and by hypostatization  the ordinary mind
            is  unable  to  conceive   it.   A  Buddhist   sutta,
            A^nguttara-Nikaaya,  asserts   as  follows   "Arising
            (uppaada) is revealed, duration (.thita) is revealed,
            and dissolution  (bhanga) is revealed.  These are the
            three  marks  of the  compounding  nature  of  things
            (sa^nkhaata)."(2)
                The assertion  points at several  things: (1) The
            experiential  process  is  a compounding  phenomenon.
            Many factors or elements are involved in the so-


                                    p.172

            called creative process. (2) The moment of existence
            or  an  experiential  event  can  be  referred  to or
            inferred by way of the three characteristics. (3) The
            three characteristics  are revealed  after the moment
            has  "transpired,"  that  is, after  the  compounding
            phenomenon  becomes a fact.  They are characteristics
            or afterglows  of the moment, so to speak.  Thus they
            are not the moment per se but visible markers  of the
            moment  for our reference.  (4) It points to the fact
            that a compounded phenomenon or a moment of existence
            is smaller than the conscious  moment.  Thus it would
            take  more than  the conscious  mind  to "grasp"  the
            moment.
                We are  not normally  oriented  to this  type  of
            fractional  dimension  in the nature  of a moment  of
            existence.  For the most part, we uncritically accept
            the condition that the mind, the conscious  mind, can
            only  function   from  the  standpoint   of  temporal
            parallelism,  that  is,  a  parallelism  that  exists
            between   a  mental   phenomenon   and  a  perceptual
            phenomenon.  An  extension  of this  is, perhaps, the
            isomorphic  theory  of  perception.  When  we  become
            conscious  of  an  object  we tend  to conclude  that
            perception  had been a simple and singular event.  We
            normally do not consider the nature of continuity  of
            the experiential  process in ways which do justice to
            the manifold  of overt as well as covert  factors  in
            function.  The  life  process,  after  all,  goes  on
            incessantly  whether  or not we are  conscious  of an
            object.  The process  never takes a holiday  although
            consciousness  does.  The Buddhist has a term for the
            basic   life-continuum,   bhava^nga.    It   is   the
            interminable    force   of   being   until   physical
            dissolution  occurs.  Thus, consciousness  rises  and
            subsides  in  bhava^nga, either  when  the  doors  of
            perception (five sense organs) are opened and various
            forms  develop  "internally"  and continue  on to the
            conscious  mind  or when the mind arouses  itself  in
            activity,  for   example,  by   recollection   or  by
            dreaming.  In consequence, the mind  is just  another
            faculty, like other sense  faculties, and it is never
            really aloof from or transcendent of the experiential
            process.  Indeed, it plays a vital  role in the whole
            process.  Naturally, I do not mean  to deny  the mind
            its abstractive  function  and thereby  to reject any
            so-called  power  over  certain  activities   we  are
            engaged    in.    We   loosely    call   this   power
            "transcendence."
                The  Buddhist  would  have  no problem  at all in
            accepting  or incorporating  the conventional  way in
            which  we  speak  of time, that  is, in terms  of the
            three  temporal  periods--past,  present, and  future
            (atiita paccuppanna anaagata).  It is the function of
            the  mind, after  all, to  conceive  of time  in that
            order  or indeed  to  give  order  to the  nature  of
            things.  Thus,  whether  it  is  simple  clock  time,
            physical   time   (measurement   of  movements) ,  or
            psychological  time, the mind  knows  or senses  time
            because  of  the  abstractive  quality.  And  to this
            extent, time is conventional (papo~nca/prapa~nca) but
            very useful.
                Now, the Buddhist  would take the abstractive  or
            conventional  nature of time for what it is.  It aids
            one to speak about or to analyze events that


                                    p.173

            we assign  to the past, present, or future.  There is
            no difficulty  here.  However, the Buddhist  would be
            quick to reply that a problem arises when one gives a
            strict topological nature to time and manipulates  it
            as  such  in  the  experiential  process.   The  neat
            division  into past, present, and future (or earlier,
            simultaneous, and later) is a mental  construction, a
            fiction   as  well  as  a  hindrance,  in  the  final
            analysis, when  it  comes  to  grasping  the  dynamic
            nature  of being  as kha.na-vaada.  The three periods
            are not distinct and different  entities however hard
            one may try to make  them out to be so.  This  is the
            argument used by Naagaarjuna (2-3 A.D.) to reject the
            opponent's stand on the hypostatization  of the three
            temporal  periods.  For  him  the  three  moments  or
            periods  are mutually  influencing  terms both on the
            abstractive  and concrete level of things-abstractive
            in the sense  that  all three  are mental  constructs
            which mutually  supplement  each other's  descriptive
            nature   and   concrete   in  the  sense   that   the
            experiential  process involves  a continuum  of being
            which  includes  all three  as a unique  interlocking
            phenomenon.  The past (immediate or remote in certain
            instances) is  in  the  present, just  as the  future
            (immediate or remote in certain instances) will be in
            the  present.   But  the  present  is  not  simply  a
            transference  of content  from  the  past, nor  is it
            simply  a stepping  stone to the future.  The present
            does   not  only   have   a  linear   connection   or
            relationship  with the past  and future  but multiple
            factoral relations  and conditions  in its own making
            on the vertical scale.
                Naagaarjuna   spoke   for   all  Buddhists,  both
            Mahaayaana and Theravaada I believe, when he resolved
            all objectifiable elements in the unique experiential
            process termed pratiityasamutpaada/pa.ticcasamuppaada
            , translated as dependent` or relational-origination.
            The objectifiable  elements refer to the abstract  or
            concrete entities, as the case may be, which the mind
            creates and to which it assigns certain realities  or
            objective  contents.   These  are  in  the  realm  of
            conventional  nature,  as  stated  earlier, and  thus
            rightly  constitute  the  realm  of  relative  truths
            (sa.mu.rti-satya).  But in truth, we do live  greatly
            in the realm  of relative  truths  because  it is the
            realm    of   the    visible,   the   tangible,   the
            manipulatable, the empirical. Yet, the Buddhist would
            remind  us not to rely  too heavily  on the relative,
            that the relative is not the only realm of existence;
            indeed, the relative must seek its raison d'etre in a
            wider,  purer, nonobjectifiable  realm.  This  is  in
            reference    to   the   supreme    realm   of   truth
            (paramaarthasatya), the goal of all Buddhists.
                We shall  have to concentrate  on the concept  of
            relational-origination, but before  doing  so let  me
            pause  to summarize  that, from  the Buddhist  stand-
            point, experiential  events do not take place or flow
            in time.  Rather, it would  be more  accurate  to say
            that events flow as time, thus denying any primacy to
            an absolute status of time.  If time is understood in
            this  way, we  are  able  to  appreciate  the  deeper
            dimensions  of being because now we must focus on the
            process itself, the becomingness  of being.  Here the
            sister concept of


                                    p.174

            temporality   seems  to  appear   almost   naturally.
            Temporality  at least moves us in the right direction
            and seems to permit  us to have glimpses  of what the
            Buddhist calls reality.  It has a profound meaning in
            that  it runs  across  but  retains  or contains  the
            multiple set of conditions and factors at play in the
            experiential  process.  It is intimately tied up with
            the concept of relationalorigination.
                It     is     significant     to    note     that
            relational-origination  is  a  hyphenated  term.   It
            depicts a total arising or origination  (sam-uppaada)
            within  the  matrix  of  a complex  of  relations  or
            conditions  (pa.ticca/pratiitya) .   The  complex  of
            relations, more  specifically, refers  to  the  term,
            paccaya/pratyaya,  which  may  differ   in  numerical
            accounting  with  respect  to the different  Buddhist
            schools,  (3)  but,  essentially,  it  describes  the
            multifaceted, multirelational  factors and conditions
            involved  in  the  development  of  the  experiential
            process.  While  these  factors  seem  to  be graphic
            structural descriptions  of the process, it should be
            emphasized   that  they  are  vital  factors  in  the
            "internal" ontological development  of the process or
            even   of   consciousness   itself.   Again,  we  are
            dealing   with  a  microscopic   process,  infinitely
            smaller  than  the process  of conscious  play.  As a
            matter  of  fact,  we  are  dealing   with  so-called
            preconscious units of movement.  It is interesting to
            note that the Abhidhamma  claims that the duration of
            thought is one-sixteenth  of the duration of a moment
            of  matter.(4) Yet, however  fractional  the  thought
            duration  is  said  to be, the  conscious  mind  with
            thought as the goal takes seven units of movement  to
            mature or fruit from the initial opening of the sense
            doors.(5) In these microscopic processes, the various
            paccayas  are  operative;  for  example, in  a simple
            perception  of  an object, there  are  the  objective
            relation (dramma.na-paccaya), the proximate  relation
            (anantara-p.), contiguous  relation (samanantara-p.),
            antecedent   relation   (purejaata-p.) ,   consequent
            relation   (pacchadjaata-p.) ,   resultant   relation
            (vipaaka-p.) ,  etc.--all  minutely  describing   the
            "internal"  development  that leads  to consciousness
            or,  as  the  case   may  be,  it  may  not  lead  to
            consciousness.   In  other  words,  perceptual  forms
            (rape) are involved  from the moment the eye organ is
            in contact with the outside realm of object and on to
            the  consciousness  of  the  object.  Although  these
            factoral  or relational  movements  take  place  very
            rapidly,  still,  it  is   possible   to   speak   of
            preconscious    (not    particularly    subconscious)
            developments.   Incidentally,   the   relations   are
            directed,  ultimately,  to  the   understanding   and
            fulfillment of the way to the enlightened state. This
            would involve  analysis  of the elements  within  the
            meditative   exercise  or  discipline,  but  that  is
            another technical accounting for another time.
                In  sum,  the  paccayas  amplify  the  conditions
            involved   in   the   experiential   process   called
            relational-origination.  As such, there  is no simple
            but are invariably  complex  occurrences.  There  are
            successive events, to be sure, but they do not follow


                                    p.175

            one  another  in a trainlike  procession.  The events
            themselves  cannot  be  broken  up into  separate  or
            disparate  entities  simply because  there is nothing
            that  separates  or  isolates  them  into  clear  and
            distinct realms.  In fact, the rapidity of the events
            in the nature of interlocking phenomenon prevents one
            from  holding  such  a view, although  it  is  common
            practice  to look upon these events as separable  for
            our    own   view,   understanding,   guidance,   and
            anticipatory action. From the Buddhist standpoint, as
            seen  earlier, any  arbitrary  separation  is in  the
            nature of abstraction  and therefore relegated to the
            conventional nature of truth. Thus, the uniqueness of
            experiential events does not lie in the separable and
            independent  nature  but  rather  lies  in the  truly
            dynamically dependent nature of things.
                To use an old metaphor, events  are taking  place
            like waves in the vast ocean. In mid-ocean the myriad
            waves  are appearing  and disappearing  as if each is
            independent of each other but in truth there are many
            factors and conditions at play which make it possible
            for each wave  to appear  and disappear  thus and so.
            Such is also the nature of the rise and subsidence of
            consciousness.
                All this goes to show that relational-origination
            is a conditioning  or compounding  phenomenon;  it is
            exhibiting  the complex  but unique  way in which  an
            experiential  event  transpires.  Most  of us fail to
            fathom   its  meaning,  much   the  less  its  actual
            occurrence, because  we are caught up in the elements
            of  convention.  We  do  not  perceive  the  rise  or
            subsidence  of events  properly  because  we are in a
            bind with the elements, though unconsciously  for the
            most part. But it is heartening at least to know that
            despite    the   conventionality    of   things   the
            life-continuum  moves  on as usual.  Herein  lies the
            truth of existence and perhaps the way out.
                There  is  a  famous  Buddhist  saying,  "He  who
            discerns  relational-origination  discerns the Dhamma
            (Buddhist  Truth), and  he who  discerns  the  Dhamma
            discerns relational-origination."(6)
                If I read  the saying  correctly, it is asserting
            that  we  who  are  conventionally  caught  up in the
            elements  of the  process  of relational-origination,
            though  unknowingly, can still perceive  the Buddhist
            nature of reality within that self-same  process.  In
            other  words, the path  to the enlightened  realm  is
            always open; it is never closed. In fact, the closure
            is of one's own making. That is to say, various types
            of hindrances  or obstacles are created over a period
            of time and these become  parts of one's experiential
            process.  For example, there are obstacles that arise
            based on the three basic "ills," that is, greed
            (raaga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha), or based
            on the four  "overpowering  forces," that  is, forced
            being  (bhava), wrong  or dogmatic  view  (di.t.thi),
            sensuality  (kaama), and general ignorance (avijjaa).
            One is usually influenced  by any or all of the above
            grounds  of  forced  living, from  which  it  becomes
            increasingly  difficult  to disengage oneself as time
            goes on, if one


                                    p.176

            remains  unmindful.  So, in the Socratic  manner, the
            worst type of ignoramus is the one who does not admit
            his ignorance.  Only the Buddhist  would make certain
            that the nature of ignorance has another dimension, a
            dimension which has to do with the ontological nature
            of  the  experiential  process, that  is, so long  as
            one's  experiential   process   does  not  take  into
            consideration  all the factors involved  the ignorant
            status  remains.   The  experiential  process  is  an
            inclusive   total  process,  one  that  includes  the
            epistemological realm. Thus even the domain of reason
            must  be  subsumed   under  the  larger  context   of
            experience.  We all readily  admit this much, but our
            experiential  data  are by and large  controlled  and
            influenced by what reason assigns.
                The concept of relational-origination depicts the
            dynamic  coming  together  or  a  gathering   of  the
            factoral conditions into a whole, that is, a becoming
            of an event.  It is the real concrete  nature  of the
            experiential  process  "seen"  long enough before  it
            moves on to the next coming  together  process.  In a
            sense,    we     may     say     that     a    single
            relational-origination  "takes time" for its fruition
            but not in the usual sense  of the phrase.  I believe
            the Buddhist  would use the term, samaya, to describe
            the temporal  nature of that single  process.(7) This
            term presents a temporal dimension or temporality  to
            the reality  of experience.  Perhaps, we may say that
            Buddhist  temporality  means a kind of "arresting  to
            see" phenomenon of the experiential  process.  We are
            all in the process  and yet  we do not "see  clearly"
            because we are in bind with the elements of the three
            basic "ills," the four "overpowering forces," general
            defilements   (kilesa/kle'sa) ,  etc.--all  of  which
            compel  us  to repeat  or  engage  ourselves  in  the
            conventional    conditioned   ("veiled")   realm   of
            existence.  This is in general  called sa.msaara, the
            famous  spinning  of the Wheel of Life or Birth-Death
            Cycle  of Being.  As long  as we force  the wheel  to
            spin,  we  cannot   see,  much   less   realize,  the
            enlightened  path and realm.  As all Buddhists  know,
            the realms  of sa.msaara  and nibbaana/nirvaa.na  are
            not mutually distinct and exclusive.  Their realms of
            function  are coterminous.  we find this idea clearly
            expressed  in  the  thoughts  of  such  Buddhists  as
            Naagaarjuna  and Buddhaghosa  (5 A.D.), that is, that
            relational-origination  functions equally in both the
            samsaaric and nibbaanic  realms.  If it did not, then
            nibbaana would be a mysterious concept, a never to be
            realized realm of existence; it would be a fiction, a
            myth, a castle-in-the-sky  concept.  But  as Buddhist
            doctrines  are  empirically  grounded, at  least  the
            fundamental  ones, the nibbaana content must find its
            source or basis accordingly.
                At  this  point, the  logical  question  is, what
            makes it possible for relational) origination to span
            both  realms? Or, how could  the two realms  have the
            same basis  of being? We have arrived  at the crux of
            Buddhist  experience  or  reality.  Naagaarjuna,  for
            example,  says  that   it  is  because   of  suuyataa
            (voidness) that  everything  is  possible.(8) By this
            remark  he means, if I read  him correctly, that  the
            experiential   process  with  all  its  contents   or
            elements is


                                    p.177

            held together  in virtue  of 'suunyataa  as a kind of
            "voidal  being,"  or, from  another  standpoint, that
            'suunyataa  is  the  basis  of  the  undifferentiated
            nature which gives substance to the differentiations.
            Thus,  'suunyataa   is   a  supreme   experience   of
            ontological  togetherness.  It holds  our experiences
            together   because   it  is   not   limited   to  the
            differentiated  (conventionalized) realm.  It  is the
            "substance"  with which one "ferries"  oneself to the
            other shore, so to speak.
                Buddhaghosa,  coming   a  few  centuries   later,
            asserts in a similar vein that relational-origination
            ("The Wheel of Becoming") reveals no known beginning,
            no maker, no experiencer; it is void (su~n~na) with a
            twelvefold  voidness (that is, reference to the sense
            faculties  and the sense objects, including  the mind
            and its  objects) and spins  on and  on.(9) Again, we
            note the central  role  of 'suunyata  ("voidness") in
            the ordinary experiential process. 'Suunyataa is what
            makes  the two realms  coexistent, not side  by side,
            but  as  two  sides   of  the  same   reality.   Thus
            relational-origination   spans  the  sa.msaaric   and
            nibbaanic  realms, because it is in essence a voidal,
            undifferentiated process.(10)
                I     venture      to     say      then      that
            relational-origination,  in  its  unique   sense   of
            voidness, refers to a Buddhist notion of temporality.
            In this sense, temporality  is that experience  which
            is coterminous  with  the reality  of things  as they
            are.  It is to  catch  the  Wheel  of Becoming  as it
            really  is.  Perhaps, Buddhist  temporality  is  just
            another  bridge-concept  in amplifying  the tenets of
            meditative  discipline, for one of the most important
            steps in samaadhi  (concentration) is the development
            of  the  state  of  rest  (samatha)  or  tranquillity
            (passaddhi).  As I see it, rest or tranquillity  must
            somehow  be relatable  to the concept of temporality.
            The  achievement  of rest  is necessary  for  one  to
            perceive   things   in  their   proper.natures,  that
            is,  within  the  process  of  relational-origination
            Temporality offers a dimension of rest, a coolness of
            being, to our experiential  process.  It is a way  of
            being  with  the life-continuum, comprehending  it in
            its  natural  flow,  and  living  in  the  unhindered
            heightened  sense.  Temporality  is "lived  time" and
            from which the sense of the eternal issues forth.(11)

            CONCLUSION
            In the preceding brief discussion I have attempted to
            present  a single  approach  in order to focus on the
            question  of time and temporality.  I have shown that
            the  concept  of  time  (kaala) is a general  concept
            which  is used  in the ordinary  conventional  sense,
            such   as,  variations   of   clock   time   or   the
            psychological nature of time.  However, this usage is
            really an abstraction  and a limitation, without  the
            unsuspecting  mind really knowing.  Thus the Buddhist
            would  not place  much emphasis  on this type of time
            since it is not conducive  to the development  of the
            path   of   enlightenment.   As   a  consequence,  in
            discussing   the  Buddhist   concept  of  reality  or
            experience, we turned  to the concept  of temporality
            to give  us a fuller  accounting  of our experiential
            pro-


                                    p.178

            cess.    That    process    was   analyzed    to   be
            relational-origination (pa.ticcasamuppaada), which in
            its essential  way reflects the nature of temporality
            (samoya) ,  the   coming   together   of  an   event.
            Temporality is, in a sense, the fruition of a wave in
            the ocean.  It clearly describes a durational  moment
            or rest to exhibit itself, but it also has the nature
            of voidness  ('suunyataa), which  permits  a wave  to
            rise  and  subside  in the waters.  The  experiential
            events  are then never separate  or discrete  for the
            experiencer  always describes  his own lifecontinuum,
            his  own  wheel  of becoming, within  the  matrix  of
            totality. Temporality becomes an important ingredient
            in the Wheel of Becoming  because  it expresses  that
            capture  of rest  which  not  only  gives  an eternal
            flavor to becomingness  but an overview on the course
            of things.
            _____________________________________________________

            1.  I view late Buddhist developments, especially  in
                the Mahaayaana, as only expansions  or extensions
                of the fundamental  thought of Buddhism and not a
                deviation in any drastic sense. If some do appear
                deviant,  for  example  in  tantric  or  esoteric
                types, they were so in terms  of differing  times
                and  circumstances, but  the basic  thoughts  wee
                "secretly" guarded all along.

            2.  I, 152 (PTS trans., Cradual  Sayings, I:135).  It
                is interesting  to note that  the same  paragraph
                goes on to say cryptically  that the three  marks
                are not revealed.

            3.  The  Abhidhamma  philosophy   offers  twenty-four
                types of paccayas which an later abstracted  into
                four principal ones:aaramma.na-paccaya (objective
                relation  a condition), upanissaya-p.  (sufficing
                relation) ,  kamma-p.  (actional  relation),  and
                otthi-p. (presence relation). The Sarvaastivaada,
                on the other hand, introduces  the ten relational
                "causes," six of which are more causal  in nature
                (kaara.na-hetu,     sahabhuu-h.,     sabhaaga-h.,
                samprayukta-h., sarvairaga-h, and vipaaka-h.) and
                four  more relational  in nature  (hatu-pratyaya,
                samanantara-p.,  alambana-p.,  and  adhipoti-p.).
                While  the first six are new, the last  four  are
                identical with four of the Abhidhamma's poccayas.

            4.  E.R.   Sarathchandra,  Buddhist   Psychology   of
                Perception (Colombo: The Ceylon University Press,
                1958) ,  p.43.   Cf.   also  Nyanaponika   Thera,
                Abhidhamma   Studies   (Kandy,  Ceylon:  Buddhist
                Publication  Society,  1965), p.  112.  Shwe  Zan
                Aung, in his introductory essay to the Compendium
                of Philosophy (London: Luzac & Co., 1972), p. 26,
                says: 'The Buddhists have cane to speak of matter
                as lasting for seventeen thought moments."

            5.  Op. cit., Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 27-30.

            6.  Majjhima-Nikaaya: I, 191. (PTS trans., The Middle
                Length Sayings. I:236-237.

            7.  Samaya  is  to be distinguished  from  the  term,
                kaala,   which   describes    the   general    or
                conventional nature of time.  Samaya is closer to
                the actual  becoming  nature of being because  it
                gives  the sense  of gathering  coming  together,
                arising, a kind of "durational passage."

            8.  Muulomadhyamakakaarikaa, XXIV, 14.

            9.  Visuddhimagga, XVII, 273.

            10. This voidal undifferentiated process is "greater"
                and "wider" in dimension  than the differentiated
                realm of existence. Therefore, it is accommodative
                or  inclusive  of  the  latter.  In  a sense, the
                undifferentiated  is the unlimited a nonconfining
                realm. Time does not permit me to develop further
                the interplay  or interfusion  of the two realms,
                but suffice it to say that the Hua-yen  School in
                China handled  the situation  beautifully  in the
                concept  of dharmadhaatu.  Its  treatment  of the
                nonobstructiveness  of the ten periods of time is
                an extension of the above concept.

            11. Doogen  Zenji  (1200-1253), the great Sootoo  Zen
                master,  made    the   following    observations:
                "Temporality  (uji) means  that time is existence
                and existence time" "As different entities do not
                obstruct one another, so do different moments not
                obstruct  one  another."  "Passage  (experiential
                process)   is   like   spring    with   all   its
                manifestations, i.e., spring


                                    p.179

                comes  to  pass  without  any  external  elements
                intervening."   [Shobogenzo    Chapter   on   Uji
                (Tamporality   or  Temporal   Reality) ,  passim.
                Shobogenzo   Chuukai   Zensho,   11:1-66  (Tokyo:
                Mugs Sanboo 1912)].  Dogen's  thoughts seem to be
                a crystallization of Hua-yen philosophy which was
                touched upon lightly in footnote 10.  However, to
                sum  up and amplify  his words, we might  assert:
                "Flowers do net bloom in the spring.  Flowers in)
                bloom are spring!"

     

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