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    Vasubandhu on the Vatsiputriyas' fire-fuel analogy
     
    [ 作者: James Duerlinger   来自:期刊原文   已阅:5024   时间:2007-1-15   录入:douyuebo


    ·期刊原文
    Vasubandhu on the Vatsiputriyas' fire-fuel analogy

    James Duerlinger
    Philosophy East and West 32, no. 2(April, 1982).
    (c) by the University Press of Hawaii.
    pp.151-158


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    .

     

                                    P.151

            In the final section of the Abhidharmako'sa, entitled
            Pudgalanivi'scaya,    Vasubandhu    criticizes    the
            Vaatsiiputriiyas' use of an analogy to a fire and its
            fuel  to  defend  their  claim  that  a person  is an
            inexplicable  substance.(1)  A person  was said to be
            inexplicable   in  the  sense   that  he  is  neither
            different   from   nor  the  same  as  the  mind-body
            aggregates  in reliance  upon  whose  presence  he is
            called  a  person.   Vasubandhu's  critique  of  this
            analogy  has  not, to  my  knowledge, been  correctly
            translated or interpreted  by modern scholars such as
            Stcherbatsky.(2) I shall here offer what I believe to
            be the correct translation and interpretation  of his
            critique.
                Vasubandhu   begins  his  investigation   of  the
            Vaatsiiputriiyas'  view  after  reminding  the reader
            that liberation  is achieved  only by destroying  the
            inborn  idea  of a self totally  different  from  the
            mind-body aggregates and that the term "self " is, in
            fact, a convenient  label  for the collection  of the
            mind-body   aggregates.   The   Vaatsiputriiyas,   as
            Buddhists, agreed  with the first of these two claims
            but  not with  the second, since  they  rejected  the
            notion  that  the  mere  collection  of the  mindbody
            aggregates  can be a self whose actions result in its
            own sufferings and whose efforts give rise to its own
            liberation.  Instead, they asserted  that the self or
            person who can perform these functions cannot be said
            to  be either  different  from  or the  same  as  the
            mind-body   aggregates,   that   is,  a   person   is
            inexplicable, although  he  is  called  a  person  in
            reliance upon the presence of his aggregates.
                Vasubandhu  first objects to this view by arguing
            that if a person is called a person in reliance  upon
            the presence of the mind-body  aggregates, whether in
            reliance  upon  their  having  been  perceived   when
            present or in dependence  upon their presence  in the
            way that one phenomenon arises in dependence upon the
            presence  of another, then  the term  "person"  would
            still seem to apply  only to those  aggregates.  Then
            the  Vatsiiputriiyas  are  represented  as  defending
            their claim that an inexplicable  person  is called a
            person in reliance upon the presence of his mind-body
            aggregates  by claiming  that  this case is analogous
            to that in which a fire is called  a fire in reliance
            upon the presence  of its fuel.  The analogy  is also
            meant  to defend  the claim that a person  is neither
            different   from   nor  the  same  as  his  mind-body
            aggregates.
                Vasubandhu's  exposition  of the Vaatsiputriiyas'
            analogy I translate as follows:

            They claim that a fire cannot be called a fire unless
            its fuel is present  and that it cannot be said to be
            either different from or the same as its fuel.  Their
            argument is that if the fire were different, its fuel
            could  not become  hot, and that if it were the same,
            the very thing which  is being burned  would  be that
            which  burns  it.  Similarly, it  is claimed  that  a
            person cannot be called a person unless his mind-body
            aggregates  are present and that he cannot be said to
            be either different from or the same as his mind-body
            aggregates. Their argument is that if the person were
            different, the consequence  would  be eternalism, and
            that if he were  the same, the consequence  would  be
            nihilism.(3)
            _____________________________________________________

            James  Duerlinger   is  an  Associate  Professor   of
            Philosophy at the University of Iowa.


                                    p.152

            Let  us  first   comment   on  the  Vaatsiiputriiyas'
            argument concerning  a fire and its fuel, and then on
            their argument concerning  a person and his mind-body
            aggregates.
                The Vaatsiiputriiyas  argued  that if a fire were
            different, that is, totally different, from its fuel,
            then, contrary  to fact, its  fuel  could  not become
            hot.  This argument  assumes  the view that  an agent
            (kart.r)  like  a fire  could  not act on its patient
            (karman) were it completely  different  from it.  The
            argument, that  if a fire  were  the  same, that  is,
            totally  the  same, as  its  fuel, then, contrary  to
            fact, its fuel would itself be the fire, assumes  the
            view that an agent  such as a fire  must be different
            from its patient  if it is to act on it.  The general
            assumption  of the  argument, then, is that  an agent
            cannot  be either totally  different  from or totally
            the same as the patient  upon which  it acts if it is
            actually to act on that patient.
                Among     the     Vaibhaa.sikas,     only     the
            Vaatsiiputriiyas   had  accepted   the  notion  of  a
            substantive  agent  which  produces  an effect  in  a
            patient.  Other  Vaibhaa.sikas  rejected  this notion
            precisely  because  a real  agent  could  be  neither
            different  from  nor  the same  as its  patient.  The
            Vaatsiiputriiyas  elected  to accept  the substantive
            existence of such agents, with the proviso that their
            ontological  status as either  different  from or the
            same  as their  patients  is inexplicable, since  all
            causal  action,  which  is  real,  requires   a  real
            agent.(4)  The category  of inexplicable  substances,
            constituted   by  such  agents,  included  fires  and
            persons.  All patients, however, were  thought  to be
            reducible   to  one  of  the  seventy-two   kinds  of
            explicable   substances,  that  is,  those  phenomena
            (dharmas)   which  are  totally  different  from  one
            another.     Unlike    other    Vaibhaa.sikas,    the
            Vaatsiiputriiyas  believed  that  the  person  is the
            agency which produces the activities of the mind-body
            aggregates, just  as  a  fire  is  the  agency  which
            produces the burning of its fuel.
                The  Vaatsiiputriiyas'   second  argument,  which
            concerns  the  inexplicability   of  the  ontological
            relationship  between  the  person  and his mind-body
            aggregates, does  not  rely  on the preceding  causal
            principle,  since  its  use  would  have  begged  the
            question.  The first part of the second  argument  is
            that   if  the  person   were  different,  that   is,
            completely  different, from his mind-body aggregates,
            then, contrary  to fact, his  eternalism  is implied.
            This  part  of  the  argument  was  accepted  by  all
            Vaibhaa.sikas, and  the  key  to understanding  it is
            that, in this circumstance, the eternalistic  view of
            the  person  is that  he is a causally  unconditioned
            phenomenon     (asa.msk.rtadharma).     Since     the
            Vaibhaa.sikas   included   all  causally  conditioned
            phenomena  (sa.msk.rtadharmas)  among  the  mind-body
            aggregates,  they  argued   that  if  the  self  were
            completely  different  from the mind-body aggregates,
            it would have to be, if it existed at all, a causally
            unconditioned phenomenon. But the three kinds of such
            phenomena  accepted  by the  Vaibhaa.sikas  did   not
            include the self. Moreover, the Vaibhaa.sikas claimed
            that a causally  unconditioned  self  does  not exist
            because it can be neither directly  nor inferentially
            cognized.
                The second  part of the argument  is that  if the
            person  were  the  same, completely  the same, as his
            mind-body  aggregates, then  the nihilistic  view  of
            self is implied.  Nihilism, in this case, is the view
            that there can be no self which suffers the results


                                    p.153

            of its actions  according  to the law of actions  and
            their results.  The Vaatsiiputriiyas realized that if
            the person  is completely  the same  as the mind-body
            aggregates, conceived  as a collection  of  momentary
            substances, the person is actually many persons, each
            existing  for a single  moment, with the result  that
            the person who performs  an action cannot be the same
            person  who suffers  its  result.  Thus, the  law  of
            actions  and their  results, which requires  that the
            results of an action performed  must be suffered   by
            the same person who performs the action, is violated.
            Hence, the  identification  of the  person  with  the
            aggregates  entails  the denial of the law of actions
            and their results, a denial  which the Buddha labeled
            nihilism.
                Vasubandhu   replies   to  the  Vaatsiiputriiyas'
            analogy by considering  three accounts  of a fire and
            its  fuel  (actually   offered,  presumably,  by  the
            Vaatsiiputriiyas)  and then showing  that none of the
            three is consistent with their main thesis.  A fire's
            fuel, of course, is what  can  be burned  and  a fire
            itself is what burns that fuel.  Vasubandhu, however,
            demands a more exact account.
                The first  attempt  to give an account  of a fire
            and its fuel I translate as follows:

            They say that the fuel of a fire is said by the world
            to be things  such as unignited  wood, which  are the
            sorts of things  which can be burned, and that a fire
            is said to be things such as ignited  wood, which are
            the sorts  of things  which  burn  the fuel.  A fire,
            blazing  and intensely  hot, ignites  and burns  fuel
            because  it  brings  about  a transformation  in  the
            fuel's  continuum.  Both  a fire  and  its  fuel  are
            composed  of the eight elemental  substances, and the
            fire  arises  in dependence  on the  presence  of its
            fuel, just as curds arise  in dependence  on milk and
            the sourness of milk on its sweetness.(5)

            The Vaataiiputriiyas'  more exact  account  of a fire
            and its fuel includes  [1] an explanation  of fuel as
            ignitable  material  not yet ignited and a fire as an
            ignited  material  which  is an agent  acting  on its
            fuel, and [2] an explanation  of a fire and its fuel,
            so defined, which  accords  with  the  Vaibhaa.sikas'
            account  of  the  elemental   composition   of  gross
            objects,  as  well   as  their   account   of   their
            dependent-arising.
                Vasubandhu's retort is short and to the point:

            But on this account of how a fire is called a fire in
            reliance  upon  the  presence  of  its  fuel,  it  is
            different  from  its  fuel,  since  it  exists  at  a
            different  time.  Moreover, if a person, in the  same
            way,  arises   in   dependence   on   his   mind-body
            aggregates, not only must he be different  from them,
            but also he must be impermanent.(6)

            The  main  point  Vasubandhu  has  made  is  that, so
            defined  and explained, a fire is not an inexplicable
            substance, since it arises in dependence  on its fuel
            in the  same  way  that  one  explicable  impermanent
            substance arises in dependence on another. An ignited
            material  arises  after, and  in  dependence  on, the
            unignited material which is to be ignited. Therefore,
            on this  explication  of a fire  and  its fuel  their
            causal  relation  does  not  entail  the  ontological
            inexplicability  of a fire, and so, neither  does the
            causal  relation  between  a person and his mind-body
            aggregates  entail  the inexplicability  of a person.
            The point  is added  that a person, like a fire, thus
            explained, would also be impermanent, since a central
            concern  of the Vaatsiiputriiyas  was to deny that  a
            person is impermanent.


                                    p.154

                The crucial  problem  with  the Vaatsiiputriiyas'
            first  account  is  that  a  fire,  as  an  ignitable
            material  already ignited, must exist after its fuel,
            as an ignitable material not yet ignited, is present.
            Consequently, the  Vaatsiiputriiyas'  second  account
            attempts to remedy this defect.

            Then, again, suppose that the Vaatsiiputriiyas  reply
            that a fire is just the heat which occurs when things
            such as wood are being  ignited  and that its fuel is
            constituted by the three elements which co-exist with
            that heat.(7)

            Among the eight coexistent elemental substances which
            were believed  to constitute  such gross  objects  as
            ignited wood are the elements popularly called earth,
            air,  fire,  and  water,  whose  physical  functions,
            respectively, are  repulsion, attraction,  heat,  and
            motion.  The suggestion is made that a fire, which is
            a gross object  rather than the fire element  itself,
            is the  heat  present  in the  ignited  materials  by
            reason  of the presence  in them of the fire element,
            and that its fuel  is comprised   of   the  materials
            which are being ignited and are  also  in the ignited
            materials  by reason  of the presence  in them of the
            earth, air, and water  elements.  If a fire  and  its
            fuel  are so explained, then  a fire  does  not arise
            after its fuel is present, since both exist only when
            materials  are being ignited.  Since heat present  in
            the  ignited   materials   is  the  agent  which   is
            transforming  materials  into  ash, and so on, it is,
            properly speaking, the fire which burns the fuel.
                Vasubandhu  raises  his first  objection  to this
            account as follows:

            But then  a fire will  still  be different  from  its
            fuel,   since   each   has   a   different   defining
            property.(8)

            The basis upon which the Vaibhaa.sikas  distinguished
            as  completely   different   from  one  another   the
            seventy-five  kinds  of  phenomena  they  counted  as
            substances  knowable to the mind is that each had its
            own  defining  property  (lak.sa.na).   Consequently,
            since the heat present in an ignited material  is not
            other  than the fire element  present  in it, and the
            materials   being  burned  are  not  other  than  the
            elemental substances  which constitute them, yet each
            of the four elements  has its own defining  property,
            if a fire is the heat present in the ignited material
            and its fuel is the material  being burned, a fire is
            completely different from its fuel.  Hence, a fire so
            defined  is not an inexplicable  substance, and if it
            is not, it is not  a proper  analog  to the  supposed
            inexplicable person.
                The  second  objection  to the  Vaatsiiputriiyas'
            second account is as follows:

            Moreover, what can "in reliance  upon"  mean now? How
            can  a fire  be called  a fire  on the  basis  of the
            presence  of its fuel? The fuel would  not be a cause
            of the fire or of a fire being called  a fire,  since
            the fire itself  will now be the basis  upon which it
            is called a fire.(9)

            The Vaatsiiputriiyas  had originally  claimed  that a
            fire is called  a fire in reliance  upon the presence
            of its fuel, but if the  fire  itself  is present, as
            here  implied, why  should  its being  called  a fire
            depend  upon  the presence  of its fuel? Moreover, if
            the fire and its fuel  are both  present, how can the
            fire arise in reliance unon the presence


                                    p.155

            of its fuel? In other words, its fuel would  not then
            be a cause of the arising of the fire.
                An obvious way to sidestep the last objection  is
            to redefine "in reliance upon" so that when one thing
            relies upon another for its existence, the first need
            not exist after the second.

            If it is said that "in reliance upon" signifies  that
            the  fuel  supports  the existence  of the  fire  and
            co-exists  with it then it follows that the mind-body
            aggregates also support the existence of a person and
            co-exist  with  him, in which  case it is also  clear
            that the separateness of a person from his aggregates
            is accepted.(10)

            The point is that if the Vaatsiiputriiyas  claim that
            this same relation  obtains between  a person and his
            mind-body  aggregates, then the person  is completely
            different from them, just as the fire element and its
            heat are completely  different  from the other  three
            elements.

            Moreover, a person  would  not then  exist  when  the
            mind-body aggregates  are not present, just as a fire
            would not exist when its fuel is not present.(11)

            The Vaatsiiputriiyas  did not hold  the view  that  a
            person   cannot   exist   apart  from  his  mind-body
            aggregates.  Strictly  speaking, their view is that a
            person  exists who cannot  be given a name unless his
            aggregates  are present, since he cannot be perceived
            unless  they  are present.  Had they asserted  that a
            person  exists  only  if his aggregates  are present,
            they would  have been committed  to a view they  were
            trying  to avoid, namely, that after death the Buddha
            no  longer   exists,  since  at  death  the  Buddha's
            aggregates  cease to exist.(12) The Vaatsiiputriiyas'
            view, therefore, conforms  to the Buddha's  own claim
            that  his  own status  after  death  is an undeclared
            topic, since on their view, it cannot be said whether
            or  not  the  Buddha, a person, exists  after  death,
            since the conditions  under which the question  could
            be  answered   no  longer  exist.   For  this  reason
            Vasubandhu's  objection hits the mark, since it shows
            that  if the  Vaatsiiputriiyas  claim  that  a person
            coexists with, and his existence is supported by, his
            aggregates,  then, contrary  to  their  own  view, he
            would not exist when his aggregates no longer exist.
                Vasubandhu's last objection to the second account
            of a fire and its fuel concerns its consistency  with
            the  Vaatsiiputriiyas'  argument  that  if a fire  is
            completely different from its fuel,  its  fuel  could
            not become hot.

            Also, the Vaatsiiputriiyas'  claim, that if a fire is
            different  from  its fuel, then  its fuel  could  not
            become hot, becomes problematic.  For what does "hot"
            name?  If  it  names  that  whose   nature   is  heat
            [au.s.nyam], then  the  fuel  definitely  lacks  heat
            because   it  is  constituted   by  the  other  three
            elements.  But if it names that which possesses  heat
            [au.s.nyavat], then  something  other  than  a  fire,
            whose  essence  is heat, can also be hot, since it is
            joined  with heat.  Hence, the difference  between  a
            fire and its fuel no longer causes a difficulty.(13)

            Vasubandhu  is claiming  that if a fire is identified
            with the heat present  in ignited  materials  and its
            fuel  with  the  materials  constituted  by the other
            three elements, then the complete difference  between
            a fire and its fuel only implies that its fuel


                                    p.156

            cannot get hot in the trivial  sense that heat is not
            the  essence  of the  materials  constituted  by  the
            earth,  air,  and  water  elements,  since   heat  is
            conventionally  ascribed  to all gross objects on the
            basis  of the presence  in them of the fire  element.
            Consequently,  the  Vaatsiiputriiyas   must   abandon
            either this second account  of a fire and its fuel or
            their  argument  for the claim that a fire cannot  be
            different from its fuel.
                Thus  far, a fire and its fuel have been equated,
            on the one hand, with ignited materials and unignited
            but ignitable  materials, and on the other hand, with
            the  heat  present  in  ignited  materials   and  the
            remaining   materials   of  the   ignited   material,
            respectively.  Both  accounts,  however,  are  faulty
            primarily  because a real difference  between  a fire
            and  its fuel  is still  implied, since, in the first
            case, they  are really  distinct  objects, and in the
            second  case, they are really  distinct  parts of the
            ignited  ma  terials.  Consequently,  to  avoid  this
            problem, the final alternative account is given.

            Then, again, suppose that the Vaatsiiputriiyas  reply
            that both a fire  and its fuel  are comprised  of the
            whole of the ignited wood, etc.(14)

            Vasubandhu's  reply is that this alternative  implies
            the  sameness  of  a  fire  and  its  fuel, which  is
            inconsistent  with the idea that the first is given a
            name in reliance upon the presence of the second. And
            so, with regard to their analogs:

            But then  how can it be explained  that  a person  is
            called a person in reliance upon the presence  of his
            mind-body   aggregates?   For   if   the   aggregates
            themselves  are also the person, the view  cannot  be
            avoided that they are the same.(15)

            The Vaatsiiputriiyas  initially claimed that a person
            is called a person in reliance  upon the presence  of
            his mind-body aggregates because they believed that a
            person  could  not  be said  to be the same  as them.
            Therefore, this third account  of a fire and its fuel
            must be abandoned.
                Having  determined   that  none  of  these  three
            acounts  of a fire and its fuel shows  that a fire is
            an inexplicable  substance which receives its name in
            reliance  upon  the presence  of its fuel, Vasubandhu
            concludes that the Vaatsiiputriiyas'  conception of a
            person  as an inexplicable  substance  which receives
            its  name  in  reliance  upon  the  presence  of  the
            mind-body aggregates  is not analogous to the idea of
            a fire  being  called  a fire  in reliance  upon  the
            presence  of  its  fuel,  since  a  fire  is  not  an
            inexplicable substance.

            Therefore, it is not  established  that  a person  is
            called a person in reliance upon the presence  of his
            mind-body  aggregates  in the same way that a fire is
            called  a fire in reliance  upon the presence  of its
            fuel.(16)

            The general  argument  for this  conclusion  has been
            that  the three  ways  in which  the Vaatsiiputriiyas
            have (or could  have)  explained  what a fire and its
            fuel  are  do not  justify  the  claim  that  a fire,
            because  of its  causal  relation  to its fuel, is an
            ontologically inexplicable substance.


                                    p.157

                                    NOTES

            1. Ahhidharmako'sa    and   Bhaa.sya    of   AAcaarya
               Vasubandhu   with  Sphu.taarthaa   Commentary   of
               AAcaarya  Ya'somitra,  Part  IV,  ed.  D.  Shastri
               (Varanasl:  Bauddha  Bharati  Series,  1973),  PP.
               1189-1234, esp.   pp. 1193--1195  (hereafter cited
               as ADK IV).

            2. I   have   been   able   to   discover   only   T.
               Stcherbatsky's   translation  and  interpretation,
               which  may  be found  in The  Soul  Theory  of the
               Buddhists,    (Varanasl:    Bhaaratiiya     Vidyaa
               Prakaa'sana, 1970), PP 15-19 (hereafter  cited  as
               STB).

            3. ADK  IV.,  p.  1193.  Stcherbatsky  translates  as
               follows (STB, pp. 15-16):

            Vaatsiiputriiya.  If there  is no  fuel, neither  (is
            there  anything)  we can apply  the name of fire  to.
            Nevertheless  we neither  can maintain  that fire  is
            something  different  from  burning  fuel  nor can we
            assert  that  it  is the  same.  Were  it  altogether
            different,  fuel  could   not  contain   any  caloric
            element, (which we know it always does contain).  But
            if  there  were  no  difference   at  all,  then  the
            substance  that burns  and the something  that singes
            would   be  (one   and  the  same  substance).   This
            illustrates (the relation b etween the Individual and
            its elements). If the elements of a personal life are
            absent,  we  do  not   use   the   term   Individual.
            Nevertheless   we  neither  can  maintain   that  the
            Individual  is something different from its component
            elements, nor can we assert  that they are identical.
            (In  the  first  case)  the consequence  would  be an
            eternal (Soul), (in the second) its total absence.

            In  a long  footnote  (pp.  93-96)  to  this  passage
            Stcherbatsky explains "the Buddhist theory of matter"
            so that the Vaatsiiputriiyas'  argument  against  the
            total  difference   between  fire  and  fuel  may  be
            understood.  He  believes, as his  translation  makes
            clear, that  they  are  arguing  that  the  elemental
            substance, called fire, could not be present  in fuel
            if fire were totally different from fuel. However, on
            this interpretation the Vaatsiiputriiyas  are made to
            equivocate  on "fire" (agni), since the fire which is
            said  to be not different  from  its fuel  is not the
            elemental substance called "fire," but what the world
            calls  fire.   The  Vaatsiiputriiyas   accepted   the
            standard  Buddhist  account  of the  elemental  fire,
            which  was  held  to  he  different  from  the  other
            elements   which  also  compose  all  gross  material
            objects.

            4. Cp.  STB, p. 62.  In his footnote (p. 107) to this
               passage, Stcherbatsky  fails to make the important
               point   that   the   Vaatsiiputriiyas   themselves
               accepted  the  view  that  the real  existence  of
               causal action requires the existence of an agent.

            5. ADK  IV, pp.  1193-1194.  Stcherbatsky  translates
               (STB, pp. 16-17) as follows:

            Vaatsiiputriiya.  Now, as used in common  life (these
            terms have the meaning of wood and flames). When wood
            or any other  fuel  is bursting  into  flames, people
            say: "this is fuel", "it is burning".  With regard to
            the flames  they  say: "This  is fire", "it  singes".
            Flames  and intense  heat are the agency which burns,
            i.e.  destroys, fuel in the sense that the continuity
            of its existence  undergoes  a change, (it  is turned
            into ashes). But (from the scientific point of view),
            both fuel and fire are composed of (exactly  the same
            set)  of  eight   primary   constituents   (the  sole
            difference  consisting  in the circumstance  that  in
            fire the caloric  element  is more prominent  than in
            fuel).  If the production  of fire is conditioned  by
            the presence  of fuel, it  is just  as the production
            of  curds  which  is  conditioned  (by  the  previous
            existence of milk), or the milk's sour taste which is
            conditioned by its previous sweet taste.

            Stcherbatsky's  rendition  of this account  of a fire
            and its fuel falsely  suggests  that a fire is merely
            the  flames  and beat  which  burn  a fuel, which  is
            merely the wood, and so forth, which are being burned
            by  the  flames.  In fact, it  is  essential  to  the
            account given that a fire is ignited material and its
            fuel is unignited material. Vasubandhu's criticism of
            this account would not apply to the view Stcherbatsky
            ascribes  here  to  the  Vaatsiiputriiyas, since  the
            flames  can only  exist  simultaneously with the mat-
            erials  being burned  by them.  The Vaatsiiputriiyas'
            first  vew, as represented  by Vasubandhu, is that  a
            fire is a burning material and its fuel is a material
            which can be burned by the burning material or fire.

            6. ADK IV, pp. 1193-1194.

            7. ADK IV, p. 1194. Stcherbatsky translates (STB, pp.
               17-18)  this passage  as if it were a continuation
               of Vasubandhu's critique of the first account of a
               fire  and its  fuel.  However, Vasubandhu  clearly
               marks  off this  new account, as he does the third
               (ADK IV, p.  1195), with the words  "atha puna.h."
               Also,  Stcherbatsky   translates  "u.s.nya.m"   as
               "caloric  element"  rather  than  as "heat," which
               creates    the   false    impression    that   the
               Vaatsiiputriiyas meant to identify a fire with the
               elemental  fire  rather  than  with  its  physical
               function.

            8. ADK IV, p. 1194.

            9. Ibid.

            10. Ibid.


                                    p.158

            11. Ibid. Stcherbatsky seems to have interpreted this
                sentence (STB, p.  18) not as a criticism  of the
                Vaatsiiputriiyas' position, but as a confirmation
                of the Vaatsiiputriiyas'  view that, when  a fire
                and its fuel are construed  in this way, a person
                cannot exist apart from his mind-body aggregates:

            (Then indeed it would follow that) no Individual  can
            exist in the absence of its component  elements, just
            as well as no fire can exist in the absence of fuel.

            However, had the Vaatsiiputriiyas espoused this view,
            they  could  not  have  claimed  that  a person  is a
            substance (dravya).

            12. Cp.   Vasubandhu's   later   dispute   with   the
                Vaatsiiputriiyas  about  the  undeclared  topics,
                especially  where  the Vaatsiiputriiyas  (BTS, p.
                52) are represented as saying that the Buddha did
                not state whether he existed after death for fear
                of  being   misunderstood   as  maintaining   the
                position  that a person  is an eternal  substance
                completely    different    from   his   mind-body
                aggregates.

            13. ADK IV, p.  1195.  Stcherbatsky  translates  this
                passage (BTS, pp. 18-19) quite differently:

            Vaatsiiputriiya.  To this we have  already  answered,
            that if fire be altogether  different  from fuel, the
            latter could not contain any element  of heat, (which
            it always  does contain).  Vasubandhu.  (Yes, you did
            say so), but what do you understand by heat? If it is
            the caloric  element  fuel never  will be the same as
            heat, since it is (in this case)  represented  by the
            other  constituents  of  matter.  (They  will  be  as
            different   as  one  constituent   differs  from  the
            others).   Vaatriiputriiya.   But  then   the   other
            coexisting element may be possessed of heat.  In this
            case it will be established, that  they are different
            from fire, as far as the latter is represented by the
            caloric   element,   but   they   nevertheless   will
            represent  heat  also, in as  much  as they  will  be
            pregnant  with heat.  Hence there is no fault in them
            being  different  substances, (since  they  are  thus
            united).

            Stcherbatsky  interprets the last part of the passage
            to be the Vaatsiiputriiyas'  reply to the charge that
            their  second  account  of a fire  and  its  fuel  is
            inconsistent with their argument for the claim that a
            fire cannot  be completely  different  from its fuel.
            Their  reply,  he  thinks, is  that  a  fire  is  not
            completely  different  from its fuel because both can
            be hot, although only the fire "is represented by the
            caloric  element," that is, has heat  as its essence.
            However, I cannot see how the Sanskrit can be made to
            fit Stcherbatsky's interpretation, He was most likely
            led  to this  view  by his  misinterpretation  of the
            Vaatsiiputriiyas' initial argument.

            14. ADK IV, p.  1 195.  Stcherbatsky failed to notice
                that  an entirely  new account  of a fire and its
                fuel are now being given ("atha puna.h") in order
                to avoid the difficulty that, on the two previous
                accounts, they  are substantially  different.  He
                interprets  the  sentence  as Vasubandhu  calling
                attention    to    an    implication    of    the
                Vaatsiiputriiyas'  reply to the charge that their
                second account is inconsistent  with their denial
                of the total  difference  between  a fire and its
                fuel.

            15. Ibid.

            16. Ibid.

     

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